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RECONCEPTUALIZING CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES
V.F. NOURSE'
In 1933, one of the leading theorists of the criminal law, lerome Michael,
wrote openly of the criminal law "as an instrument of the state. " Today, crimi-
nal law is largely allergic to claims of political theory; commentators obsess about
theories of deterrence and retribution, and the technical details of model codes and
sentencing grids, but rarely speak of institutional effects or political commitments.
In this Article, I aim to change that emphasis and to examine the criminal law as
a lool for governance. My approach is explicitly constructive: it accepts the
criminal law that we have, places it in a counterfactual perspective, and asks
what this means for institutional arrangements-our relations to each other and
to the state. This focus is then applied to reconceptualize a variety of criminal law
defenses, ranging from sel-fdefense and insanity to necessity and provocation. In
the analysis of these doctrines, I argue that defenses cannot be fully explained by
the standard inquiry into individual minds, characters, or virtues. Instead, de-
fenses reflect the need for a liberal polity to control vengeance. I go on to argue
that the standard view may yield a "paradox" of individualization which, in some
cases, may actually work to the detriment of individuals. To undertake this kind
of inquiry invites particular avenues of inquiry in the criminal law that have
never received enough support, such as history and comparative law; and provides
a new perspective on a variety of theoretical developments of the past decade, in-
cluding the collapse of the harm principle, the increasing importance of social
norm scholarship, and the impact offeminism on the substantive criminal law.
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INTRODUCTION
It is occasionally confessed that "the doctrines of substantive
criminal law have [little] to do with the causes or prevention of crimi-
nal behavior."' If there is any truth to this, then a rather large ques-
tion is left looming: What does explain the criminal law? Deterrence
and retribution, the twin pillars of much criminal law theory, too of-
ten disappoint. Think about it for a moment: if we truly wanted to
deter more crime, or exercise our vengeance to its utmost, we would
"string 'er up," kill the offender's children, or jail the innocent. We
don't do these things-not necessarily because of deterrence or retri-
bution (whatever these otherwise capacious ideas mean)' but because
the resulting political order would be intolerable.
We know that dictatorships deal with crime very easily. We also
know that they seek to legitimize their violence through the criminal
law. Hitler's criminal code formed mens rea and actus reus in the im-
age of the Volk; Stalin's code formed these same ideas in terms of Bol-
shevik ideology." Today, the new Chinese criminal code purports to
limit criminalization to the "harm" principle,' but then defines harm
in ways that enable the punishment of dissent. Now think about why
our criminal law may look as it does. Perhaps we have forgotten to ask
2 FoUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 6 (Leo Katz et al. eds., 1999).
On the various cthural meanings of deterrence, see Dan Kahan, 7,e Secret Ambi-
tion of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 415 (1999), which details the expressive con-
tent of deterrence arguments. For a survey of vaious forms of retril)ution arguments,
see FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 2, at 48-154 (1999).
,I For some, this will seem obvious; for others, controversial. Some believe, for ex-
ample, that a mixed theory of deterrence limited by retributive aims may suffice to
avoid at least some of the possibilities I have outlined above. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART,
PUNISHMENT AN) RESPONSIIIIrIr': ESSAYS IN THF, PHILOSOI'IHYOF lAw 8-12 (1968) (ar-
guing, famously, that retribution is not a "justifying" but a "distributive" aim of pun-
ishment, limiting the distribution of punishment to particular persons). Retribution as
wrongdoing-specific (as limiting distribution) does not necessarily prohibit a state
from wreaking vengeance on particular political enemies or particular races if the rele-
vant society believes that the political or racial opposition is committing a grave wrong.
5 Contrary to popular imagination, both Hitler and Stalin spent an enormous
amount of time on criminal codes that otherwise sought to legitimize the violence of
the state. On specific doctrines, see intfa notes 31-32.
JOHN STUART MILL, ON I.IBER'IY 13 (Stefan Collini ed., Cambridge Univ. Press
1989) (1859).
7 Compare Mi Zhotu & Shizhou Wang, China, [2 Crim. L.] Int'l Encyclopedia L.
(Kltwer Law Int'l) para. 27 (Jan. 2001) ("Fnndamentally, a criminal offence shotuld be
harmful to society. Without social harmfulness, no conduct can be deemed a crime."),
with id. para. 26 (defining a criminal offense as anything that "subverts the state power
of the people's democratic dictatorship and overthrows the socialist state").
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whether our criminal law both reflects and helps to construct our own
liberal political order.
Some intellectual grounding for this hypothesis can be obtained
from John Rawls's famous essay, Two Concepts of Rules." Although the
essay is known for other reasons, it makes a very important argument
about the nature of punishment as an institution. Rawls argues that
the standard tools of punishment discourse-retribution and deter-
rence-tend to reflect unstated institutional assumptions: utilitarian
arguments tend to favor the ideal of the legislator who looks to the fu-
ture, general needs of the polity; retributive views, by contrast, tend to
assume a judicial and retrospective approach focusing on individual-
ized justice.'0 To dramatize the importance of these institutional as-
sumptions and effects, Rawls imagines a rule of individual moral atroc-
ity (punishment of the innocent) and considers its institutional
implications (the imaginary system created is dubbed "telishment").'
The point of the telishment example is to show that rules appear-
ing to aim at individuals may also transform the practice of punish-
ment, changing the nature of the offices and roles of those who gov-
ern.'2 As Rawls puts it, "[o]nce one realizes that one is involved in
setting up an institution, one sees that the hazards are very great."'
There follows, in this essay, a list of questions about the design of the
institution of punishment and the conduct of officials-whether and
JOHN RAWLS, Two Concepts oJ'Rudes, in COLLECTEI) PAPERS 20 (Samuel Freeman
ed., 1999).
*i Rawls suggests that these concepts are, among other things, crude projections of
institutional identities and roles. Seeid. at 23-24 ("[0] ne notes that the diflerent sorts
of considerations which would usually be offered as reasons for what is done under the
cover of these offices can be paired off with the competing justifications of punishment
[retribution and deterrence].").
10 Id. at 23.
11 Rawls also stated:
Once this is understood it is clear what the countermove to Carritt's argument
[about punishing the innocent] is. One must describe more carefully what
the institution is which his example suggests, and then ask oneself whether or
not it is likely that having this institution would be for the benefit of society in
the long run. One must not content oneself with the vague thought that,
when it's a question of this case, it would be a good thing if somebody did
something even if an innocent person were to stiffer.
Id. at 27 (emphasis omitted).
12 Id. at 23. It follows that Rawls would disagree with Hart that many of the seem-
ingly "individualized" features of the criminal law are necessarily "exceptions" to the
general social welfare. He likely would be committed to the position that the "indi-
vidualizing" features also serve institutionalized (or generalized) ends.
13 Id. at 27 (emphasis omitted).
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how, in a system of telishment, we are ever to know whether these of-
ficials are "authorized" to issue a "telishment" or systematically "de-
ceptive" about telishment.14 Put in other words, once one punishes
the innocent, one not only harms the individual punished but also
creates collateral effects for the law-abiding and for those who govern
the practice of punishment.
The logic of this claim parallels the insights of other disciplines,
such as law and economics, which insist that to understand the effect
of a law, one cannot simply look at the law itself." One must look, as
well, to "how people will respond" to the law and what relations they
will create in response.' Rawls is looking at the institutional and po-
litical (rather than market/contract) effects of individualized rules
and arguing that one cannot understand an individualized rule (pun-
ishing an innocent man) without considering important responses to,
or effects of, the rule on (1) law-abiding citizens; (2) legal officials;
and (3) the relations created between them. Just as a rule that pun-
ishes speech is likely to have "chilling" effects (all law-abiding speakers
respond to the rule), the practice of telishment not only causes harm
to the individual thrown in jail but inspires widespread fear in the
populace about "whether the same fate won't at any time fall on
them."'" The rule also has effects on the relation between citizens and
their government; a law that gives officers discretion and opportuni-
ties for deception in the determination of "who" is innocent is likely to
yield widespread distrust in government officials. In such a world, the
"people will come to have a very different attitude towards"' the prac-
tice of punishment and, I would add, their government as a whole.
The risks of which Rawls speaks are what we might call risks to a
political order or claims of political structure.'' This insight invites
14 See id. at 27 (For example, what check is there on officials? How is one to tell
whether or not the actions are authorized? How is one to limit the risks involved in
allowing such systematic deception?").
15 SeeJennifer Arlen, Comment: The Future of Behavioral Economic Analysis of Law, 51
VAND. L. REv. 1765, 1765-66 (1998) (describing this as the "central contribution of
Ronald Coase's pathbreaking article" (citing R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3
J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960))).
H; ld.
17 RAWLS, supra note 8, at 28, Essentially, a rule of liability that focuses on individ-
ual wrongs not only protects the individual but, correspondingly, limits the discretion
and potential for fraud and overreaching of institutions.
Id.
19 Consider, in particular, Rawls's references to "legislation" and "adjudication":
One can say, then, that the judge and the legislator stand in different posi-
tions and look in different directions: one to the past, the other to the ftture.
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important questions about modern views of the criminal law. Since
the 1970s, there has been an often unstated consensus that the proper
level of analysis of the criminal law is at the individualized level of
mind or conduct (whether of individual defendants or the collective
sum of all potential defendants). Moreover, it has been assumed that
the "individual level" forms an "exception to" and is "opposed to,"
rather than "constructive of," more generalized rules and institutional
commitments. Thus, H.L.A. Hart famously contended that excuses
were the individualizing price that a social system of crime control had
to pay to protect the "choosing self. 2 0 But if punishment is seen as a
practice, if criminal laws have collateral institutional effects, then per-
haps defenses do not represent a price at all, instead serving impor-
tant purposes not only for defendants but for the law-abiding majority.
Indeed, this might explain how, in a world of "tough on crime" poli-
tics, we have any defenses as all.
In this Article, I accept Rawls's invitation to consider punishment
as an institution. In Part I, I tease out of the criminal law a latent po-
litical economyia set of relations implicit, yet unexpressed, in con-
ventional criminal law theory and public discourse about the criminal
law. Using the perspective generated by counterfactual method,' I
argue that doctrines that have traditionally been thought to focus only
The justification of what the judge does, qua judge, sounds like the retributive
view; the justification of what the (ideal) legislator does, qua legislator, sounds
like the utilitarian view .... [T] hese views apply to persons holding different
offices with different duties, and situated differently with respect to the system
of rules that make ip the criminal law.
Id. at 23.
20 HART, suprfa note 4, at 17-24. Hart, of course, recognizes that there is a systemic
element here; what Rawls appears to dispute is that individualizing features necessarily
negate the claims of society (or political institutions) rather than being potentially
consistent with them.
21 My method here, as elsewhere, see, e.g., V.F. Nourse, A Popular Consitutional
Anatomy: Toward a New View of the Separation of Powers and Federalism, 56 STAN. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2003), is counterfactual, by which I engage in thought experiments
which isolate particular forms of legal rules or doctrine to consider their "constructive"
effects. This follows the literature in the social sciences and, in particular, in interna-
tional relations, which has recently focused on counterfactual method as a way to test a
causal proposition. See, e.g., Richard N. Lebow, What's So Different About a Counterfac-
tual?, 52 WORLD POL. 550, 581-84 (2000) (proposing eight criteria that are appropriate
to plausible-world counterfactuals in social science); Robert N. Strassfeld, If... : Coun-
terfactuals in Law, 60 GEO. WATASi-i. L. REV. 339, 365-68 (1992) (discussing the use of
counterfactuals relating to laws concerning human reactions and behavior). It is also
Rawls's method when he constructs the "telishment" institution as a means to explore
the embedded institutional commitments of what we call punishment. See RAWLS, su-
pra note 8, at 27 (defining the institution of "telishment").
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on defendants may actually reflect less about the hearts and minds of
defendants than about the needs of the law-abiding and their per-
ceived relation to their government. In Part II, I apply this approach
in a place where its application might seem unexpected-to a variety
of criminal law defenses, including self-defense, necessity, provoca-
tion, and insanity. I urge, in each case, that these defenses incorpo-
rate elements that demand deference to majoritarian norms and aim
to prevent private punishment.2 Put in other words, as Emile Durk-
heim posited so long ago, the criminal law is not constructed for de-
fendants, it is constructed for the law-abiding.'
In Part IIl, I respond to potential objections to this approach that
argue it is illiberal because it looks beyond individual minds or charac-
ters or "choosing selves." I claim that, in its crudest forms, an analysis
that is conducted solely at the individualized level may backfire; it may
actually undermine a liberal polity's own stated aim to respect the in-
dividual. Efforts to intellectually sequester the defendant from the
state yield a "paradox of individualization" in which state oppression
may thrive, implanted by the law into descriptions of persons' minds
and actions.2 4 If criminal law theorists are looking for a liberal politi-
cal theory that can help explain the criminal law, they would be better
advised to consider the institutional implications of what Stephen
Holmes has called the "anti-self-exemption" principle."' Finally, in
22 As Jerome Bruner has put it, in a democracy, the law symbolizes a "successful
struggle against tyranny and autocratic arbitrariness"; and this is nowhere more true
than in the criminal law's aim, as reflected in its most particular doctrines, "to stem
cycles of revenge." JEROME BRUNER, MAKING STORIES: LAW, LITERATURE, LIFE 45-46
(2002).
23 On Durkheim, see DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIEiy 74-76
(1990), which describes DUrkheim's reversal of "our usual understanding of the target
population of' penal measures" as having achieved "canonical" status in the "sociologi-
cal world." I differ, of course, from a sociological analysis, and Durkheim's own, by
arguing here that the criminal law reflects not emotional solidarity but tenets of a po-
litical solidarity.
24 This argument, as one will see, bears a strong resemblance to a Foucauldian cri-
tique. I have chosen not to emphasize this intellectual connection because of the
common assumption that Foucault's ideas are invariably hostile to liberal governance.
For a different view, see Andrew Barry et al., Introduction to FOUCAULTr AND POLITICAL
REASON: LIBERALISM, NEO-LIBERALISM AND RATIONALITIES OF GOVERNMENT 1, 7-12
(Andrew Barry et al. eds., 1996) (reconsidering Foucault's views and liberalism).
25 See STEPHEN HOLMES, THE ANATOMY OF ANTILIBERALISM 238 (1993) (arguing
that "hyperindividual [ism] ... is explicitly ruled out by the strong norm at the heart of
liberal morality: the self-exemption prohibition" (emphasis omitted)); see aLo infra
text accompanying notes 190-95 (using this principle to define a liberal position that
rejects exemptions that prefer one group to another, thus reinforcing the superiority
of that group).
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Part IV, I sketch out some implications for this "collateral effects" ap-
proach toward the substantive criminal law, hoping to show how it
may help us understand apparently anomalous theoretical develop-
ments in the criminal law, such as feminism's successes, the harm
principle's demise, and the recent turn toward social norms.
I. THE CRIMINAL LAw AND GOVERNANCE
Imagine a world in which there were no criminal laws. If one as-
sumes a society of persons of different strengths and a certain level of
natural aggression, then it is fairly easy to imagine a rather nasty and
brutish gathering, one that is "ruled by the strong."' It also seems
clear that, when we replace our Hobbesian "rule of the strong" with a
"rule of law," we must beware that we may reinvent the same "rule of
the strong." (After all, without state legitimization, an arrest is no dif-
ferent from a kidnapping.) It is in this sense that the criminal law im-
plies institutions of governance; it reflects an aspiration toward a non-
violent ordering of society that controls both the individual and the
state.
At least in theory, then, the criminal law should be seen as a fun-
damental agent in maintaining a just relation between citizen and
state. Although this premise is widely accepted by rather ancient po-
litical philosophers, 2 ' one is unlikely to read about it in much contem-
porary scholarship on the criminal law or political theory. Indeed, as
George Fletcher has commented, "Criminal punishment is the most
2 See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN ch. XIII, para. 9 (A.P. Martinich ed., Broad-
view Press 2002) (1651) (describing life in this type of world as "solitary, poor, nasty,
brutish, and short").
27 See infia notes 175-84 and accompanying text (discussing Locke's view in par-
ticular); CHARLES DE SECONDIAT BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT O1. L\ws, bk. 111,
ch. 5 (Prometheus Books 2002) (1748) ("Now in republics private crimes are more
public, that is, they attack the constitution more than the)' do individuals ...."). It is
also worthwhile noting that the state's role in the criminal law appears as an elemen-
taryjurisprudential proposition. As one introductory text explains:
The state is the complaining party in a criminal action ... and in a sense views
itself as the injured party. Thus unlike the case in private or civil actions...
the concern of the state is not to address injuries to individuals per se but only
to address such injuries to the degree that they also constitute attacks against
the state.
JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JULES L. COLEMAN, PHILOSOPHY OF LAw 114 (rev. ed. 1990).
The role of political norms and institutions is also a staple of social theory. See, e.g.,
GAR AND, supra note 23, at 257 ("[T]o represent the business of punishment... and
to organize penal practices accordingly, promotes a particular image of the state and
of its authority, and of its relationship to offenders and other citizens.").
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elementary and obvious expression of the state's sovereign power....
In the contemporary writing on political theory, however, both crimi-
nal law and criminal procedure receive short shrift. 2 8 This gap is par-
ticularly acute for the standard criminal law scholar who, when not
busy trying to "solve" the crime problem or deciphering sentencing
grids, tends to imagine the criminal law in opposition to, rather than
constructive of a political order. '
If the conventional wisdom disappoints, life and history do not.3
At some level, we recognize that the criminal law and political life are
not unrelated. We see the name of the State in case captions. And we
28 George P. Fletcher, The Fall and Rise (f Criminal Theory, I BUFF. CRIM. L. REV.
275, 287 (1998) (noting an "omission" in the literature on criminal law to explore the
connections between criminal law and political philosophy).
29 There are, of course, recent and important efforts to place the criminal law
within political context. See KATE STITII & JOSfI A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING:
SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FED)ERAL COURTS 9-38 (1998) (discussing the political
history of tle sentencing commission); Kahan, supra note 3, at 419-35 (discussing theo-
ries of punishment and how they relate to political conflict); William J. StUntz, The
Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MicHi. L. REv. 505, 512-19 (2001) (discussing
tile political incentives to consistently expand the scope of the criminal law). Political
theory has figured occasionally in the work of philosophers. See, e.g., MURPHY &
COLEMAN, supra note 27, at 109-37 (analyzing the problem of criminalization and pun-
ishment within the context of social and political philosophy); Benjamin C. Zipursky,
Seif-Deense, Domination, and the Social Contract, 57 U. PITr. L. REV. 579, 613-14 (1996)
(seeking to reconcile the apparent conflict within political theory between liberal po-
litical philosophy and dominance theory in feminism). Still, political theory has re-
ceived little sustained attention among standard criminal law scholars. For a recent
and impressive defense of the political theory perspective, see Guyora Binder, Punish-
ment Theoty: Moral or JPolitical?, 5 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 321, 333 (2002) (arguing that
"both utilitarianism and retributivism were originally political theories concerned with
the legitimacy of punishment as an institution"). Contemporary British writers on the
criminal law have tended to be more interested in questions of political theory. See,
e.g., NIcOLA LACEY, STATE PUNISHMENT: PoLrIICAL PRINCIPLES AND COMMUNIIY
VALUES (1994) (focusing on the punishment theory in the context of questions such as
political obligation and the reinforcement of community values).
30 Lest we think our government has been above the use of criminal law for bla-
tantly "political" ends, it is always wise to remember the passage of the Alien and Sedi-
tion Acts, Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (expired 1801); Act of July 6, 1798,
ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577 (expired 1801); Act of June 25, 1798, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570 (expired
1800); Act ofJune 18, 1798, ch. 54, 1 Stat. 566 (repealed 1802),-an attempt by some
of the "founders" to use the criminal law to punish the members of a dissenting party.
See MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, "THE PEOPLE'S DARLING PRIVILEGE" 52-79
(2000) (discussing the history of the Sedition Act controversy); id. at 102 (quoting St.
George Tucker as urging that these laws would mean that an administration might
"'consider[ I every thing as a crime against the government, which might operate to
their own personal advantage'").
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have read, in our history books, of Stalin's jailing of his enemiesj of
Hitler's vision of treason," and even of the grave American misuse of
the criminal law to disenfranchise and enslave African Americans in
the post-Civil War era." Indeed, if we pause for a moment, we may re-
alize that no democratic system may sustain itself if its people fear cor-
ruption or violence (as recent experience in the new eastern-
European democracies quite clearly demonstrates)."' Finally, we may
remember that no government that uses the criminal law to oppress
its citizens may claim the title of a republic. As Elizabeth Anscombe
31 See PETER H. SOLOMON, JR., SOVIET CRIMINAL JUSTICE UNDER STALIN 232-44
(1996) (discussing Stalin's use of the justice system for his own political ends). As
Solomon insists, Stalin used the crinminal law not just for terror alone, but also as "all
instrument of rule." 1I. at I. In fact, Solomon stated:
From the early 1930s Stalin made Soviet criminal law his own. Virtually every
change bore the mark of his hand, and he used the criminal law for many
purposes-to squeeze grain out of hungry peasants, to pressure and scapegoat
his officials, to reverse the decline in the birth rate, to inculcate labor disci-
pline in the workforce-as well as to deter juvenile delinquency, hooliganism,
and theft. In the process, Stalin extended the scope of the criminal law be-
yond its usual functions and made punishments unusually severe.
Id. at 4.
'42 On Adolf Hitler's use of the criminal justice system to help him achieve his po-
litical agenda, see H.W. KOCH, IN THE NAME OF THE VOLK 38-51 (1989). For a con-
temporary account that emphasizes the relation between political theory and the
criminal law in Germany, see E.A.M. Wedderburn, Criminal Law in the Third Reich, 48
JURID. REV. 373 (1936). See also Obituary, Fraz Guertne, German Ministet; N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 30, 1941, at 21 (discussing changes in the Nazi criminal law system).
3 Our nineteenth-century version of apartheid, for example, was not only an in-
sult to individuals bnt also a system of white aristocracy that was perpetuated, in part,
through the use of the criminal law. See ERIC FONER, THE STORY OF AMERICAN
FREEDOM 104 (1998) (describing how the "Black Codes... denied blacks equality be-
fore the law.., and imposed on them mandatory year-long labor contracts ... and
criminal penalties for breach of contract"). On the use of crime as inherently attached
to race and thus used as a means to disenfranchise and keep African Americans offju-
ries, see, for example, Norris v. Alabama, which reported the testimony of a jury com-
missioner in 1935 that he did "'not know of any negro in Morgan County... who is
generally reputed to be honest and intelligent and... who is not an habitual drunk-
ard, who isn't afflicted with a permanent disease or physical weakness ... and who has
never been convicted of a crime involving noral turpitude.' 294 U.S. 587, 598-99 (1935)
(emphasis added); see also Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 233 (1985) (striking
down an Alabama constitutional provision which disenfranchised blacks on the basis of
"crimes of moral turpitude" on the grounds that this was a pretext for intentional ra-
cial discrimination).
34 See SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT: CAUSES,
CONSEQUENCES & REFORM 26 (1999) (stating that "pervasive corruption undermines
the legitimacy of government"); Amy L. Chua, Markets, Democracy, and Ethnicity: Toward
a New Paradigm for Law and Develop ment, 108 YALE L.J. 1, 56 (1998) (noting, in the con-
text of developing democracies, how "too much corruption effectively can subvert the
political process, replacing democracy with kleptocracy").
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once put it, violence may present the "fundamental question of politi-
cal theory."' '
To see how this is reflected in the criminal law, however, one must
put to the side some conventional ideas. Standard criminal law schol-
arship has been largely allergic to political theory. Indeed, by the
1970s and 1980s, there was a consensus within the academy that all of
the most important theoretical questions in the criminal law were
about individuals: individual "self-control," individual dangerousness,
and individual culpability. From this crude consensus on individu-
alization appeared an odd and unexamnined corollary: that the de-
fendant and the victim exist in some kind of "separate sphere" from
the state and society and that it is the project of a progressive criminal
law to protect defendants by maintaining this separation; to make
their plight more and more individualized, more and more the prod-
uct of a strange psychology, a rotten family background, or the effects
of a peculiar syndrome."
'45 Anscolnbe stated:
The parent may in effect say "Don't hit your little brother, or I will hit you."
What is the difference-is there a difference-between his threat and the
threat of the child he so threatens? After all, the little brother may have been
doing something quite unfir. The same question arises about tile Violence of
the state. I judge that this is the fundamental question of political theory.
Elizabeth Anscombe, On the Source of the Anthority of the State, in 20 RAnTIo 1, 8 (Stephan
K6rner ed., 1978). For an extraordinarily clear introduction to the topic, see JEAN
HAMPTON, POITIC,\L PHII.Osoii y 3-38 (1997). See also MURPHY & COLEMAN, supra
note 27, at 114-17 (addressing the role of the state in executing the criminal law).
I refer here to the principal "theories" of culpability typically debated in the
criminal law academy. On choice and selfcontrol, see HARF, supra note 4, at 227-30;
on choice versus character, see R.A. Duff, Choice, Characte; and Criminal Liability, 12
LAw& PIlit.. 345, 361-70 (1993); Michael S. Moore, Choice, Character; andlExcuse, 7 SOC.
PtitL. & POL'Y 29, 31-58 (1990). On capacity for choice, see Peter Arenella, Convicting
the Morally Blaimeless: Reassessing the ,elationshi Between Legal and Moral Accountability, 39
UCLA .. REV. 1511, 1516 (1992). Newer theories have suggested a move away from
choice toward a focus on character and virtue, see Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nuss-
haum, Two Conceptions q/'Emotion in Crimincal Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 299 (1996)
(explaining that the evaluative conception of liability favors holding individuals re-
sponsible for their character and emotions), and on virtue and culpability, see Kyron
Huigens, Virtue and Criminal Negligence, I BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 431, 447-58 (1998) (fa-
voring a virtue-ethics theory of criminal law that rejects the Model Penal Code's em-
phasis on consciousness of harm).
37 Indeed, if there were a single principle that could be identified as unassailable
within the criminal law scholarship of the latter half of the twentieth century, it would
be the virtue of individualization (the idea that we can save defendants from the wrath
of the state by ever more particularly describing their character, characteristics, back-
ground, or virtle). See infra notes 141-48 and accompanying text (discussing individul-
alization).
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This view, however inarticulate, cannot be a complete explanation
of the criminal law. As many have recently shown, there is a wealth of
argument and data suggesting that social norms, status relations, and
culture more generally help to "construct" the law's very attention to
what is individual. "" Moreover, there is reason to believe that just as
social norms are upwardly mobile, so too are commonly held political
norms. To believe, for example, that the most important task of the
criminal law is to create a barrier between state and individual is to
adopt, implicitly at least, an operative political theory, one informed
by libertarian norms. Depending upon whose liberty "counts"-de-
fendant or victim-such a theory either exults in punishment (pro-
tecting the liberty of the victim) or denies its possibility (protecting
the liberty of the defendant). Not surprisingly, to the extent these po-
litical views find themselves reflected in the arguments of courts,
commentators, and the public, they result in claims that lurch wildly
from one side of the libertarian equation to the other, from defen-
dants' rights to victims' rights and back again.
All of this has led to a criminal law scholarship that has failed to
give much credence to the influence of political norms or political
theory, whether those norms emanate from history, contemporary po-
litical discourse, or doctrine itself. '  This intellectual inattention
should seem odder for two important reasons: First, it should seem
odder if we are willing to grant the thesis that norms of all kinds have
an influence on the criminal law. Second, it should seem odder given
the general unwillingness, elsewhere in the law, to rigidly separate the
public from the private. Once upon a time, we thought that the mar-
ket was the repository of an assumed separate sphere, a place where,
without question, individuals existed apart from the state.' The New
Deal changed that, at least in part, by reimagining "liberty" not as a
quality of a privileged few but as a lived, and potentially exploitative,
38 My own view is that the v'ery concept of individualization is histoically contingent.
At the beginning of the twentieth century through the 1930s, individualization was as-
sociated with burgeoning social sciences and psychologies of classification; today, how-
ever, it reflects a more modern inquiry into internal subjectivities. See DAVID GARLAND,
PUNISHMENT AND WELFARE: A HIsToRY OF PENAL STRATEGIES 28, 83-84, 89-90 (1985)
(discussing individualization as it developed in contrast to the classical school); cf.
George P. Fletcher, The Individualization of Excusing Conditions, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 1269,
1299-1309 (1974) (outlining the modern view of individualization).
39 Fletcher, supra note 28, at 287.
40 See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (upholding the general right
to make a contract as part of Fourteenth Amendment liberty).
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relation between employer and employee."' Once upon a time, we
thought that the family was a place of privacy, a place where, without
question, individuals existed apart from the state. Feminism changed
that, at least in part, by reimagining the family as a set of gendered,
and therefore potentially subordinating, relations. In what follows, I
urge that the criminal law be subjected to a similar intellectual trans-
formation, to an imagined economy of relations between citizens and
their state.
Do not misunderstand: my argument is not that we jettison con-
cern for the individual; indeed, it is precisely the opposite. Just as in
constitutional law, structure and relation'u 2 may work together to pro-
tect individuals, so too they may in the criminal law."'i Perhaps more
importantly, as the reader will see later,"' the traditional view that de-
fenses are only meant to protect individuals-as-individuals is not nor-
matively benign; this view can backfire by implanting state misconduct
-il E.g. W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (rejecting a constitu-
tional right to Contract and including government regulation in Fourteenth Amend-
ment liberty).
42 There is another potential confusion that deserves explanation: the use of the
term "relational" may conjure images of a debate between feminists and others about
the nature of rights. I confess that the theory presented here will not be seen as
"feminist" by many who may mistake its reliance on liberal political theory for advocacy
rather than defense. For those disappointed, I note here that this does not mean that
the theory will not help women (in fact, I think it does); indeed, as I argue later, this
approach helps to explain to those who have dismissed feminism why it has and should
have such an influence on the criminal law. It is not a theory, however, that depends
upon the description, for better or worse, ol women, nor is it "woman centered," nor
does it ask the "woman question," all of which strategies repeat the descriptive indi-
vidualism of crucle liberal thought in female guise. For ny views on the relational and
feminism, see my article, Law's Constitution: A Relational Crtique, 17 Wis. WOMEN'S L.I.
23, 23-56 (2002), where I argue that relational issues are "known by, and important to,
feminism," yet also "beyond feminism ... [and] important to outr ideas of constitution
and law itself." For arguments that classical liberalism does not depend upon atomistic
individualism to the exclusion of claims of equality, see HOLMES, supra note 25, at 190-
97. See also MONTESQUIEU, supra note 27, bk. V, ch. 3 ("A love of the republic in a de-
mocracy is a love of the democracy; as the latter is that of equality.").
.13 It is not a particularly controversial position within the conventional theory of
public law that structural and individual arguments may happily coexist and reinforce
each other. Indeed, almost no one in constitutional law doubts that constitutional
structure may protect individuals: some argue that this is the very reason for our con-
stitutional structure. See, CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN
CONSTrIUTIONAL lAw 33-37 (1969) (setting forth structural arguments that protect
individual rights, such as the freedom of speech); Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights (is
a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1132-33 (1991) (arguing that the Bill of Rights serves
structural purposes).
W Infra. Part IV.
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or inequalities within the very minds of those its adherents aim to pro-
tect.
II. RECONCEPTUALIZING CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES
Recently, Professors Schulhofer and Fletcher have politely dis-
agreed on a question of criminal law theory. Professor Fletcher has
renewed his call, issued long ago, for close study of political theory
and the criminal law.", Professor Schulhofer has wondered whether
such a view can give us any understanding of the real-life problems
raised by the criminal law."'; Both scholars seem to me to be right.
Professor Fletcher is right that violence poses a fundamental question
for the organization of the state. Professor Schulhofer is right that we
have yet to see scholarship in the criminal law that sustains this idea in
anything but the most abstract of terms. In what follows, I attempt to
cash out the claim for political theory in terms of collateral and insti-
tutional effects,'7 and I aim to do it in the most difficult cases, the ones
where we seem to have the most individualized rules-criminal law
defenses.
A. Seif-Definse
Let us begin with a well-known and controversial self-defense case,
People v. Goetz.' Theorists love Goetz because it appears to pit two indi-
vidualized versions of self-defense against each other. Traditionally,
self-defense is considered a justification: the defendant is seen as mer-
iting a defense because he had to make a "choice of evils. '"4" Some
15 See, e.g., George P. Fletcher, The Natuare and Function of Cniminal Theory, 88 CAL. L.
REV. 687, 698 (2000) (insisting that "[g]iven the centrality of political legitimacy in the
criminal law, one can only be amazed at the extent to which the question is ignored").
16 See Stephen .1. Schulhotker, The Mathematician, the Monk, and the 'dilitant: Rejec-
tions on the Role of Criminal Law 7"heoy, 88 CAL. L. REV. 705, 707 (2000) (arguing that
"[c]ompeting theories of the state rarely yield discrete, incompatible prescriptions for
concrete cases").
47 Special thanks go to Professor Schulhofer for politely emphasizing this as a way
to grab hold of this approach.
497 N.E.2d 41 (N.Y. 1986). On the history and meaning of Goetz, see George
Fletcher's review of the case, GEORGE P. Fi,;TICHEAIR, A CREME OF SELF-DEFENSE:
BERNiARt) GOETZ ANDt 1HE LAW ON TRIAL (1988). Goetz shot at four black youths on a
subway and was ultimately acquited. Jay Maeder, The Subway Vigilante, N.Y. DAILY
NEWS, Nov. 8, 2001, at 79.
19 "One who is not the aggressor in an encounter isjustified in using a reasonable
amount of force against his adversaiy when he reasonably helieves...he is in immedi-
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modern scholars have disagreed with this assessment, recharacterizing
the defense as a reflection of the subjective and psychological pres-
sures of the "uplifted knife," and have sought, as a result, to put the
defense in the more individualized "excuse" camp.' Neither categori-
zation has convinced everyone and neither explains current doctrine.
If the excuse variation were true, for example, then we would have to
seriously expand the law of self-defense; if the justification variation
were true, it might require us to narrow the defense quite substan-
tially.51
If the doctrine and theory disappoint, our intuitions tell a more
robust, but inarticulate, story. People feel very strongly about the
Goetz case. And yet they describe their emotions in ways that sound
positively governmental. They tell us that Goetz "took the law into his
own hands, ' ' that he was a "vigilante" or a revolutionary. '7 The fear
that appears to be expressed is that, if the law grants Goetz's defense,
he will be permitted, in effect, to "legislate" for the rest of us.5' Put in
other terms, the risk we emote in our criticisms of Goetz is a fear that a
ate clanger of unlawful bodily harm fron his adversaiT and ... the use of such force is
necessary to avoid this danger." WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 5.7 (3d ed. 2000).
50 See, e.g., Cathryn Jo Rosen, The Excuse of Self-Defense: Correcting a Historical Acci-
dent on Behaf of Battered Women Who Kill, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 11, 17 (1986) (supporting
the classification of self-defense as an excuse rather than a justification).
51 An excuse variation that is su)jectivist in origin would tend to expand the reach
of self defense beyond the "reasonable" perceptions that typically limit it. On the
other hand, a justification version might require a strong view of necessity and thus a
strong objective showing that the defendant had no other alternatives; that would
seem to require a retreat rule in evey, jurisdiction (even though we know that a major-
ity of jurisdictions does not have such a rIle). See V.F. Nourse, Sef#-Dejense and Subjectiv-
it), 68 U. Cii. L. REV. 1235, 1246-94 (2001) (discussing the meaning of"imminence"
in sell defense doctrine).
52 See Maeder, supra note 48 ("'That man look the law into his own hands,' indig-
nantly fuimed another of the four [victims], 19-year-old car-eer thief Barry Allen."); see
also A Goetz Trial Again, WASII. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1996, at A16 ("When Bernie Goetz...
took the law into his hands on Dec. 22, 1984, a lot of law-abiding citizens ... were abso-
Intel)' prepared to believe he'd acted in self-defense when he shot them. And ajtry
agreed. Mr. Goetz was acqtited of assault and attempted murder in 1987.").
53 See Cat and Mouse: The Subway Gunman on Trial, TIME, May 11, 1987, at 26, 26
(asking whether "the subway vigilante" was "justified in defending himself against what
he saw as an imminent attack, or was he a trigger-happy racist poised to strike at the
slightest provocation"); Maeder, sulnra note 48 ("The public sttpport for Goetz shows
that ... New Yorkers indeed have grown weary of the existing government.... What
remained to them was an act of revolution. This is what Goetz committed-and a lu-
rality supports him.").
4See Otto Friedrich, "Not Guilty " ]Afiy Acquits the Sitbiay Gunman, but the Argu-
ment Goes On, TIME, Jitne 29, 1987, at 10, I1 (quoting black Police Commissioner Ben-
jamin Ward's response to Goetz's acquittal as a grim "' [n]o one has a license to go oUt
and hunt anyone-black, green, yellow or whatever'").
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constitutionalist might call "countermajoritarian," a risk that the
prejudices of the few will end up governing the many. Notice that this
risk and public rhetoric are not unique to the Goetz case. Indeed, it is
a claim that, in theory, might be made of any defendant claiming self-
defense, or any defense for that matter. ' It reflects, I believe, concerns
about private punishment and its tendency to be self-exempting. If we
allow any defendant to exempt himself from the rules and challenge
the state's monopoly on violence, we fear that he will enforce the law
in ways that are excessive or partial. If, as Locke believed, men are left
to privately punish, they will exempt themselves, indulge favorites, and
punish too severely; "for men to be judges in their own cases .... self-
love will make men partial to themselves and their friends.'
At this point, it is important to see that the notion that Goetz may
have "acted above the law" is not simply a trope, but a question of his
relationship to the state. 'hAen critics say that Goetz was a vigilante,
they are making a claim not only with respect to his view of the victims
(that he viewed them with contempt) but also with respect to those
who govern. The critics are raising the structural question of whether
Goetz acted "above" the majority, enforcing a minority view by private
punishment. v  Importantly, Goetz's supporters make precisely the
opposite claim-that Goetz was enforcing what the "majority" really
wanted, that he was a "hero" and a "patriot" for taking a violent stand
55 See lane Maslow Cohen, Regimes of Private yranny: iqhot Do Thq , Mean to Morality
and for the Criminal Law?, 57 U. Prrr. L. REV. 757, 805 (1996) ("There is no doubt we
would prefer to have someone in the intolerable status of a Judy Norman invite the
state's response without, in the customary phrase, taking the law into her own
hands."); Disabled Woman Jailed for Killing Husband, TiHF HERALD (Glasgow), Sept. 29,
2001, at 10 (reporting that a Scottish judge told a woman who killed her abusive hus-
hand "that she should not have taken the law into her own hands and that imprison-
ment wotrld deter others from doing so"); Greg Hardesty, Woman Ge/s Six Years fir
Running over Husband, Courts Leslie Van Hootet Acted out of Fear in the Killing, Her Lao, er
Says, ORANGE COUNTY REG. (Santa Ana, Ca.), Aug. 31, 2001, at 4 (reporting that a
judge told an abused woman that "her httsband's conduct was 'horrific,' but that she
had no right to take the law into her own hands").
56o 1IN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT ch. 2, para. 87 (Thomas
P. Peardon ed., MacMillan Pub. Co. 1951) (1698). To be fair, Locke is apparently "re-
sponding" to an imaginary intellectual combatant when he uses these words. He
adopts this view, however, only to argue that it is insufficient because it must be ap-
plied both to the individual and to the state.
As Guyora Binder has pointed out, the very existence of the notion of vigilan-
tism suggests that our ideas of punishment are informed by political norms. Some-
times, after all, vigilantes may actually do the "right thing," according to prevailing
moral theory; but they never do the politically appropriate thing because, by defini-
tion, they fail to defer to the state. See Binder, supsra note 29, at 327-28 (noting that
"[t]he wrong of vigilante justice is a political wrong").
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for the frightened everyman. The crucial point is not to resolve such
arguments, nor to borrow this rhetoric, but to see how they are more
than arguments about Goetz as an individual-that they are argu-
ments made in the shadow of institutional claims.
One might object here that it is cruel and pointless to treat any
defendant, even a rather unattractive one, "as if' he were the state.
There is no question that the vernacular expressions are crude and
overdrawn.5s No one believes that defendants are in fact like states;
the metaphor relies not on an actual similarity of power 5 9 but, instead,
on a similarity of structure and risk. It is as if the interlocutor were
saying: if we take this defendant and we multiply him over and over
again to make a far larger population, what kind of a government or
state would we have? If we multiply Goetz a hundred-, a thousand-, or
a million-fold, will we have, as many believe, a violently imposed rule
of white supremacy, or will we have corrected a failure to protect the
everyman? The intellectual structure of this discourse, then, is me-
tonymic; the defendant stands in for our fears about governance.
Lest one remain in doubt about the importance of Goetz's rela-
tion to the state, one need only consider one of the key disagreements
in the case. Goetz premised his claims, in part, on the theory that he
had been left to suffer several muggings with no aid from the law.' " If
he acted as an apparent aggressor in the subway, if he jumped the
gtn, he seemed to say, it was not his fault, it was the fault of the state
that had abandoned him. Goetz's claim was that, in fact, he had not
acted "above" the law at all but, instead, had properly deferred to the
state-it was simply that the state had failed him.' ' All of this helped
58 The vernacular judgments made about defendants-that they take the law into
their own hands, that they are judge,jury, and executioner-are both false and true at
the same time. They are false to the extent that they appear to end the argument or
are particular to any one defendant; they are true to the extent that they reveal an im-
portant constitutive link between the criminal law and political structure. Once we
focus on thesejndgments, moreover, we can begin to question their crude application
more readily. For example, it is unclear whether calling Goetz a "legislator" or a
'judge" differentiates him from any other defendant and, to that extent, the argument
is singularly unilltiminating, partaking of the quality more of an insult than an argu-
ment.
59 On the important distinction between violence and power, see HANNAH
ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 139-216 (1965); HANNAH ARENDT, ON VIOLENCE 35-56
(1970) [hereinafter AREND I', ON VIOLENCE].
60 See FLETCHER, supro note 48, at 14 (discussing Goetz's fears stemming from a
prior mugging and an attempted mugging, and his frustration with the legal system's
response to his victimization).
Id.
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to support his adherents' claims that "Goetz" was a law-abiding citizen,
serving the interests of "everyman."
One need not resolve such a question to see that it is not easily
cabined within the minds of individuals. The standard doctrinal
treatment of Goetz's claim, however, invites us to do just that. Under
the standard treatment, we are forced to ask whether the "reasonable
person" standard should be "subjectivized" to incorporate the particu-
lar defendant's experience of prior victimization . This way of phras-
ing the question quite obviously changes the argument from one
about the proper relation of the state to the defendant to one about
the qualities and characters of defendants, reasonable persons, or sub-
jectively reasonable persons.
All of this goes some way toward explaining, in a different key, the
difficulties of some of the most controversial self-defense cases of to-
day. The case of Judy Norman is a useful example.' Judy Norman
lived a life of terror and enslavement. She was made by her husband
to prostitute herself, to sleep on the floor, and, on occasion, to eat
dog food."4 After an escalating series of events, in which police were
called but did not arrest her husband, Judy Norman tried to kill her-
self. When emergency personnel were called, her husband told them
62 See id. at 41-47 (comparing subjective and objective standards for self-defense);
JOHN KAPLAN ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW 620-38 (3d ed. 1996) (reviewing the degree to
which the reasonable person standard should be subjectivized in cases like Goetz's and
Norman's).
63 State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1989).
64 The court wrote:
The defendant testified that .... [h]is physical abuse of her consisted of fre-
quent assaults that included slapping, punching and kicking her, striking her
with various objects, and throwing glasses, beer bottles and other objects at
he. [0]ther specific incidents of abuse [included] her husband putting
her cigarettes out on her, throwing hot coffee on her, breaking glass against
her face and crushing food on her fasce ....
The defendant's evidence also tended to show. . . that her husband did not
work and forced her to make money by prostitution, and that he made humor
of that fact to family and friends. He would beat her if she resisted going out
to prostitute herself or if he was unsatisfied with the amounts of money she
made. He routinely called the defendant "dog," "bitch" and "whore," and on
a few occasions made her eat pet food out of the pets' bowls and bark like a
dog. He often made her sleep on the floor. At times, he deprived her of food
and refused to let her get food for the family. During those years of abuse,
the defendant's husband threatened nutmerous times to kill her and to maim
her in various ways.
Id. at 10.
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to let her die. The next day, after unsuccessfully seeking help from
mental health officials and social service employees, Norman killed
her husband while he was asleep.
Conventional approaches toward Norman's case treat it as an ob-
vious failure to meet the "objective" standards of self-defense law: she
killed when there was no imminent threat-there was no knife above
her head or fist in her face.' And, indeed, this is precisely what the
court emphasized in concluding that she was entitled to no jury in-
struction ol perfect or imperfect self-defense. ' " Scholars criticized
this approach, however, and have tried to explain that Norman really
had no alternative-the threat was always imminent.'' They have lik-
ened her to a kidnap victim who waits to kill until the most opportune
moment.
70
65 On the day before the killing:
[S]heriff's deputies were called to the Norman residence, and the defendant
complained that her husband had been beating her all day and she could not
take it anymore. The defendant was advised to file a complaint, but she said
she was aftaid her husband would kill her if she had him arrested. The depu-
ties told her they needed a warrant before they could arrest her husband, and
they left the scene.
The deputies were called back less than an huIr later after the defendant
had taken a bottle of pills. The defendant's husband cursed her and called
her names as she was attended by paramedics, andi he told them to let her die.
[Then the officers] chased him back into his house ....
d.
After visiting mental health personnel, Norman returned and told her husband
that she was going to have him committed because of his alcoholism; he replied that
he would "see them coming" and "cut her throat." 1d. at I1. She also went to social
services to apply for welfare; her husband followed her there, "interrupted her inter-
view and made her go home with him." Id.
67 See George P. Fletcher, Domination in the Theopy of./lstification and Excuse, 57 U.
Prrr. L. REV. 553, 567-68 (1996) (using Norman as the paradigmatic case of "doubtfttl
imminence").
See Norman, 378 S.E.2d at 12 (holding that a ,ituy instruction was not required
for "either form of self-defense unless evidence was inltroduced tending to show that at
the tine of the killing the defendant reasonably believed herself to be confronted by
circumstances which necessitated her killing her husband to save herself from imminent
death or great bodily harm").
69 See, e.g., Richard A. Rosen, On Self-Defense, 1Imminence, and Women Who Kill Their
Batterrs, 71 N.C. L. REv. 371, 372-78 (1993) (examining the replacement of the immi-
nence requirement with a broader necessity standard for self-defense, with reference
to the Norman case).
70 See Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of
Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 92 (1991) (suggesting that "[c]ourts might see Judy
Norman very differently" if they saw her case as within "the paradigm of hostages resist-
ing their captors"). On the kidnapping argument more generally, see 2 PAUL H.
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The discourse about Norman, like that about Goetz, is one that
openly embraces institutional metaphor. Critics of Norman punctu-
ate their arguments by claiming that, in killing her husband, she acted
asjudge,jury, and executioner.7 ' Those more sympathetic to Norman
invoke a different relation and set of institutional tropes; like Goetz,
they claim that Norman's problem was that the law had "abandoned"72
her to a state of nature. Just as in the case of the kidnap victim, the
state could not (or would not) come to Norman's rescue. And any
state that leaves its citizens to the mercy of the strong is a state that has
abandoned its fundamental commitment to "equal" protection of the
laws.7:
For our purposes, the important thing to see is not how to solve
these cases but what kind of discourse they evoke. Like other self-
defense cases, the Goetz and Norman cases raise important questions
about the relation of the defendant to the state. The conventional
narrative imagines that the only issue in these cases is whether we base
questions of liability on mind or choice, character or virtue. Indeed,
Goetz and Norman are often paired in casebooks as means to debate
the question about how subjectively or particularly we should "de-
scribe" the individual. "How should we define the reasonable per-
son?" we are asked over and over again . But, if I am right, this focus
ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 131 (c)(1) (1984), which uses the kidnapping
example to explore the imminence requirement for self-lefense.
71 See Fletcher, supro note 67, at 556 ("[H]owever tragicallyjudy Norman's appeals
to the authorities went unheeded, she cannot put herself in the position of judge and
exectutioner."). It should be noted that far from criticizing Norman, Fletcher is sympa-
thetic to her and ultimately argues for making "greater use of excusing conditions."
Id. at 576.
72 Cf HOBBES, supra note 26, at ch. XIII, para. 8 ("[D]uring the time men live
without a common power ... they are in that condition which is called war."). Jane
Maslow Cohen argues, in the context of those violent dominators who violate restrain-
ing orders, that
If an attempt to seek the protections of the law triggers an outbreak of war be-
tween a tyrant who has usurped the state's ftctions and the state itself ... the
worst risks of stIch a conflict [do not] deserve to fall more greatly on his hap-
less subject than on the tyrant himself.
Cohen, supra note 55, at 807.
73 See CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, TOwARD A FEMINIST THi EORY OF THIE SIATE 245-
26 (1989) (arguing that the state's "systematic failure" to enforce laws pturporting to
protect women from violence deprives women of the "equal protection" of the laws).
74 For an argument that the subjectivity/objectivity debate is undertheorized and
obscuring, see Nourse, supra note 51, at 1235.
75 For the traditional views on defining the reasonable person standard, see Sym-
posium, Sel-Defense and Relations of Domination: Moral and Legal Perspectives on Battered
Women Who Kill, 57 U. PIr. L. REV. 461 (1996).
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misses the presence of another level of argument-the institutional
level. Was the state's failure to protect only in Norman's head? Was it
really her mind that was at issue? And, if the Goetz case was only about
his state of mind, why did he argue that the state had abandoned him?
These questions suggest that a rule, like self-defense, that affects
an individual defendant may also have collateral effects upon the law-
abiding. Imagine that, tomorrow, the state eliminated all claims of
self-defense. Even when the knife is literally above his head, the de-
fendant has no defense; he must either die or, if he defends himself,
go to prison for life. As we have seen above, in the discussion of
Rawls's system of telishment," such a rule not only affects the hapless
defendant who tries to defend himself but also the rest of the citizenry
who look on and wonder whether "they will be next." To eliminate
self-defense is to create a world in which there is fear of the violent at-
tacker, of being assaulted and of having no recourse. But it is also a
world in which citizens are likely to change their attitudes toward their
government, in which the government that once was seen as protect-
ing them has abandoned them to the violence of their fellow citizens.
Perhaps then it should not be surprising that this is precisely what
Norman and Goetz argued.
B. Necessity
The relation of the law-abiding to criminal law defenses is not a
modern phenomenon. Indeed, one can see this connection quite
clearly in one of the great old cases of the criminal law, Regina v. Dud-
ley & Stephens." Shipwrecked and out of food and water, Dudley and
Stephens cannibalized a young cabin boy, Richard Parker. One con-
ventional way to consider Dudley & Stephens is to ask whether the de-
fendants' claim lies in excuse or justification.5 If one emphasizes the
defendants' lack of self-control (the natural pressures on their wills),
then one takes an excuse view of the case and of a potential necessity
defense-the defendants simply had no realistic psychological choice
76 Supra text, accompanying notes 8-18.
77 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884).
79 The standard view of necessity is that it is a justification. As one treatise puts it,
"One who, under the pressure of circumstances, commits what would otherwise be a
cime may be justified by 'necessity' in doing as lie did and so not be guilty of the
crime in question." LAFAV., supra note 49, § 5.4 (a). This view, however, is not shared
by all. Professor Michael Moore, for example, takes the view that necessity may be con-
sidered an exctuse. See Michael S. Moore, Causation and the Excuses, 73 CAL. L. REv.
1091, 1102-03 (1985) (discussing compulsion-based excuses).
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but to eat the young cabin boy.7 If one focuses, instead, on the sub-
stance of the defendants' choice-between one life and five-one
takes a "balancing of evils" or a justification approach. "" Neither ar-
gument is conclusive, for, if extended, each seems to yield rather un-
pleasant conclusions familiar to moral theorists-doctors dismantling
one live body to save five patients, and psychopaths claiming excuses
simply because they could not control their compulsion to murder."'
And indeed, neither doctrine nor theory has embraced either alterna-
tive-excuse orjustification-with complete confidence.
This standard debate occludes much about necessity claims. Such
claims often fail for reasons far afield from the defendant's psychol-
ogy, felt coercion, or the balancing of evils. Consider the protestors at
a nuclear power plant ' or an abortion clinic8 -a common form of
modern necessity case-or even the man who commits arson to save a
burning town. All of these claimants might assert plausible claims in
the form of excuse (I could not help myself) orjustification (I did the
right thing). But they all are likely to fail in the face of two additional
factors-time and alternatives. 4  In the firebreak case, if there were
79 See, e.g., Moore, sulira note 78, at 1102 (noting that when necessity is recognized
as an excuse, it is put in terms of "irresistible force" and "overwhelming pressure" on
the individual).
80 For instance, LaFave wrote:
The matter is often expressed in terms of choice of evils: When the pressure
of circumstances presents one with a choice of evils, the law prefers that he
avoid the greater evil by bringing about the lesser evil. Thus the evil involved
in violating the terms of the criminal law (taking another's property; even tak-
ing another's life) may be less than that which would result from literal com-
pliance with the law (starving to death; two lives lost).
LAFAVE, supra note 49, § 5.4(a). For an excellent defense of a different right-based
notion of necessity, see George Fletcher, The Right and the Reasonable, 98 HARV. L. REV.
949 (1985).
81 See SANFORD H. KADIsHn & STEPHEN J. SCHULH1OFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITs
PROCESSEs 860-80 (6th ed. 1995) (discussing the idea that a net saving of lives alone is
not enough tojustify the application of the lesser evil or necessity doctrines).
82 Cases dealing with protestors at nuclear power plants include People v. Hubbard,
320 N.W.2d 294 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982); State v. Warshow, 410 A.2d 1000 (Vt. 1979).
83 Cases discussing the availability of the necessity defense for protesting outside
abortion clinics include Allison v. Birmingham, 580 So. 2d 1377 (Ala. Ct. Crim. App.
1991); Cleveland v. Anchorage, 631 P.2d 1073 (Alaska 1981); People v. Garziano, 230 Cal.
App. 3d 241 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
See generally United States v. Schoon, 971 F.2d 193, 195 (9th Cir. 1992) ("To in-
voke the necessity defense ... the defendants colorably must have shown that: (1) they
were faced with a choice of evils ... ; (2) they acted to prevent imminent harm;...
and (4) they had no legal alternatives to violating the law."). For further examination
of the issue of legal alternatives, see, for example, Bird v. Anchorage, 787 P.2d 119
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time to call the fire department, the claim would fail under the rule
that there needs to be an "itmninent" threat."5 Similarly, the political
protestors are likely to find their claims rejected because they had the
time and opportunity to protest lawfully-they might have lobbied the
legislature or urged political change."' As one commentator has put
it, "if ... there is open to [the necessity claimant] a third alterna-
tive ... [other] than ... violating the law, he is not justified in violat-
ing the law.
The necessity defense demands deference to the state for reasons
we have already seen tinder the more colloquial label of "taking the
law into one's own hands."8 As one court has put it: "In a society
based on democratic decision making, ... a protestor cannot simply
assert that her view of what is best should trump the decision of the
(Alaska Ct. App. 1990); Buckley v. City ?f Falls Church, 371 S.E.2d 827 (Va. 1988); State v.
Horn, 377 N.W.2d 176 (Wisc. Ct. App. 1985), aYf'd, 407 N.W.2d 854 (Wisc. 1987).
5 See LAFAVE, supra note 49, § 5.4(d) ("It is sometimes said that tile defense of ne-
cessity does not apply except in an emergency-when the threatened harm is immedi-
ate, the threatened disaster imminent.").
See Schoon, 971 F.2d at 197-99 (holding that "necessity can never be proved in a
case of indirect civil disobedience" because "lawful political action" serves as a "reason-
able alternative"); see also LAFAVE, supra note 49, § 5.4(a) ("The defense of necessity is
available only in situations wherein the legislature has not itself, in its criminal statute,
made a determination of valnes.").
LAFAVE, supra note 49, § 5.4(d) (5). The rule of legislative alternatives, as dem-
onstrated in Schoon, makes clear that those who oppose abortion or nuclear power or
even segregation cannot Use violence to contest legislative judgments. See Schoon, 971
F.2d at 197 ("'In a society based on democratic decision making, this is how valties are
ranked-a protestor cannot simply assert that her" view of what is best should trump the
decision of the majority of elected representatives.'" (quoting Brent D. White, Com-
ment, Political Protest and the Illinois Defense ofNecessity, 54 U. CHi. L. REV. 1070, 1083
(1987))). It is fairly easy to imagine that, without such a limit, one might end up with a
set of violent mini-states, one supporting abortion rights, the other opposing Islam, the
other defending trees with axes. Whether one thinks this a good or bad idea, it is the
compromise that a state makes, in my view, to avoid a criminal law that embraces vio-
lent political agitation. Like Socrates and Martin Luther King,Jr., the civil disobedient
must write his pleas from jail. This, by the way, is not a comment on the morality of
their claims, but simply their methods in a majoritarian state.
S, This fear is expressed in both popular and legal accounts. See Schoon, 971 F.2d
at 197 ("The law could not function were people allowed to rely on their subjective be-
liefs and value judgments in determining which harms justified the taking of criminal
action."); see also Gwen lfill, Clinton Signs Bill on Abortion Protest Penalties, SEA ITLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, May 27, 1994, at A3 (quoting President Clinton at the bill-signing
ceremony as saying, "No person seeking medical care, no physician providing that care
should have to endure harassments or threats or obstrutction or intimidation or even
murder from vigilantes who take the law into their own hands because they think they
know what the law ought to be").
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majority of elected representatives.,89 The critic of necessity fears that
violent opponents of the draft or abortion or nuclear power have
acted "above" the state, exempting themselves from rules applicable to
others. This, in turn, implicates courts' view of the proper approach
toward necessity claims. As one judge opined: "In some sense, the ne-
cessity defense allows us to act as individual legislatures, amending a
particular criminal provision or crafting a one-time exception to
it ....
If any of this is right, then we may present an alternate account of
the necessity defense. We can begin to see that the doctrine of neces-
sity does more than simply focus on individuals' minds or choices and,
indeed, that it cannot be explained (in full) without a consideration
of its constructive effects. To avoid the fear that defendants are per-
mitted to "legislate," the doctrine is constructed to remit claimants to
"alternative" procedures and, in political cases, to exhaust their reme-
dies before the legislature. At the same time, the defense remains for
cases where the state is unavailable. If the defendant has, in effect,
done something (like creating a firebreak) that "stands in" for what
the law itself would have done when the state is absent, then to punish
that person is, in effect, to punish the innocent. And, as we have al-
ready seen from our consideration of the institution of "telishment,"
punishing the law-abiding/innocent can pose hazards not only for de-
fendants but for the rest of the liberal polity. Thus, the defense re-
mains available, a signal that, when there is no policeman at hand, the
law-abiding will not be punished for, in effect, abiding by the spirit of
the law.
This understanding of the necessity defense may help to clarify
the difficulties and the compromises of our most notorious necessity
case, Dudley & Stephens, because it highlights the importance of collat-
eral effects not only on other citizens but also on citizens' relations to
their government. Dudley & Stephens is a wonderful case because it is
quite literally a case about governing.' There is no clearer case of the
absence of the state: there was no one to call and no apparent rescue
in the offing. Governing in this state of nature was the issue of the day.
Both the popular and the lawyerly focus, at the time, was on the "cus-
8, Schoon, 971 F.2d at 197.
90 Id. at 196-97.
91 The odd truth about the case is, of course, that the defendants were precluded
from asserting the necessity defense. See Robert C. Berring, Book Review, 73 CAL. L.
REV. 252, 257 (1985) (indicating the trial judge's refusal to let the defense attorney
argue the law of necessity).
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tom of the sea," or the practice in which stranded sailors were to
"draw lots" to determine who would be eaten . The drawing of lots
was, of course, a crude form of governance: 4 it was a lottery aimed at
preventing dying men from preferring themselves, from being 'judges
in their own cause." This procedure invariably failed its own aspira-
tions; despite its ambitions to protect the least powerful, the drawing
of lots was not above gerrymandering. Too often, the least powerful-
the slaves, the foreigners, and the young-were the ones whose lots
came up short."
With this perspective in mind, it is possible to understand more
clearly why the English court could charge Dudley and Stephens with
errors of government; put in other words, why the opinion urged that
necessity was a "'tyrant's plea.- ' ' As in contemporary necessity cases,
where countermajoritarianism is feared, so too was it in Dudley & Ste-
phens. The judges warned of the dangers of a law that allowed the de-
fendants to change the very "definition of the crime,""' by exempting
themselves from general prohibitions. The court asked, "Who is to be
thejudge of this sort of necessity? By what measure is the comparative
value of lives to be measured? Is it to be strength, or intellect, or
what?" 7 If the decision to live or die were left in the hands of the men
92 See A.W. BRIAN SIMPSON, CANNIBALISM AND TilE COMMON LAW: TIE STORY OF
THiE TRAc.ic LAST VOYAGE OF HrlIE MIGNONErTE AND TH E STRANGE LEGAL PROCEEDINGS
t'o WiiiciH IT GAVE RISE 60-66 (1984) (examining testimony and accounts to determine
whether Dudley and Stephens discussed drawing lots); see aLho KAPLAN ET AL., su/ra
note 62, at 669 n. 17 ("Indeed, Professor Simpson reports an oral tradition that Dudley
& S'ttes were prosecuted solely because they did not draw lots."). One scholar oh-
ser'ved:
So long and entrenched was the tradition of cannibalism on the seas that pub-
lic sympathy in the sailing ports was unquestionably behind Dudley and Ste-
phens. Even the constmed Mr. Parker's older brother sought out the defen-
(kants in jail to shake their hands in a symbolic gesture of understanding. The
only point that troubled the public mind was the failure to cast lots to deter-
mine the victim.
Berring, supra note 9 1, at 255 (citation omitted).
91 See, e.g., MONTESQUIEU, suplra note 27, at bk. 11, ch. 2 ("The suffrage by lot is
natural to democracy; as that by choice is to aristocracy. The suffrage by lot is a
method of electing that offends no one... (citation omitted)).
4 See, e.g., SIMPSON, supra note 92, at 60-66, 123-24 (recounting instances when a
young boy, a foreigner, and a slave were each the first to be cannabalized on their re-
spective ships).
95 Regina v. Dudley & Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. 273, 288 (1884) (quoting JOHN
MILTON, PARADISE LOST bk. 4,1. 394 (Alistair Fowler ed., Longman Group Ltd. 1971)
(1667)).
96 Id.
97 Id. at 287.
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on the boat, its execution would be self-interested and partial: "[T]he
principle leaves to him who is to profit ... to determine the necessity
which will justify him in deliberately taking another's life to save his
own."" Not surprisingly, Dudley and Stephens had chosen "the weak-
est, the youngest, the most unresisting. This was a plea of the strong
against the weak, the plea of a "tyrant" who held powers of both legis-
lation and execution in the same hands."')
I believe that, in Dudley & Stephens, the court decided as it did less
because of the defendants' evil minds or growling bellies than because
the court was worried that the "custom of the sea" was a method of
governance too easily subject to abuse. We know this, in part, because
history tells us that the case was constructed for the precise purpose of
announcing a new rule that would change the "custom of the sea.""
Ultimately, of course, to modern readers, this raises its own concerns:
who, after all, was the "tyrant" when the government had constructed
the case to "change" the rules in the middle of the game? Was not the
court the one that was "legislating" in ways that the defendants could
not have anticipated? So thought much of the public, whose only
complaint was that the defendants had not abided by the existing
rules, the drawing of lots." 2 Indeed, this ambivalence was reflected in
the ultinatejudgment: a new rule was announced for future cases but
not at the defendants' expense; their sentence was commuted by the
Crown to six months in prison."'
18 d.
Id.
100 It is one of the most hallowed statements of the "separation of powers" that the
joining of these powers in a single person is the height of despotism. As Montesquien
made clear, this is because of self'preference-the ruler with legislative and executive
powers may create self-preferential rules that are then executed self-preferentially. See
MONTESQUIEU, supra note 27, at bk. XI, ch. 6 ("When the legislative and executive
powers are united in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be
no liberty; because apprehensions may arise, lest the same monarch or senate should
enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner.").
It is clear the sailors knew the then-CUrrent law of the sea, SIMPSON, supra note
92, at 140, and equally clear that the court'sjudgment in Dudley & Stqep/ens was meant
to change that law, see id. at 240 ("No doubt the reason for going through with the
formal death sentence was to dramatize the condemnation of the custom of the sea.").
102 See Berring, supra note 91, at 255 (noting that the public viewed the "failure to
cast lots" as the only controversy).
103 Brian Simpson tells us that this kind of pardon had been contemplated from
the beginning. SeeSIMPSON, supra note 92, at 240 ("[l]t had been assumed throughout
[the trial] that [Dudley and Stephens] would promptly be pardoned."). This is not
simply an isolated case of "compromise" but an incidence of what Meir Dan-Cohen has
called "selective transmission," the tendency of the law to modulate or obfuscate what
amount to "decision rules." See Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rides and Conduct Rules: On
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C. Provocation
Since necessity and self-defense are most often considered justifi-
cations, one might question whether this kind of analysis illuminates
more traditional "excuses," which tend to focus on individual person-
ality. Here, I aim to widen the field and make the more difficult ar-
gument that even defenses that appear far more comfortable in the
"excuse" or "partial excuse" camp may be understood at an institu-
tional level.. Indeed, I think that such an account explains some of the
oddities of both the law of provocation and of insanity. Neither de-
fense, it turns out, is solely about mind or passion; both are con-
structed in the image of their collateral effects on the law-abiding.
Even more than self-defense or necessity, ideas of provocation
have vacillated greatly within criminal law theory."" ' The traditional
theory of provocation imagines it as a partial justification-a defen-
dant provoked to kill by a wrong inflicted upon that defendant is par-
tiallyjustified in killing if a reasonable person in the situation would
have been similarly provoked.'"15 The provoking wrongs originally
condoned by the common law-among them, adultery, attack, and
false arrest-have in large part receded to the demands of the reason-
able man. "  Today, many jurisdictions simply require that any provo-
cation will do as long as a reasonable person would be similarly pro-
Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625, 635-36 (1984) (stating his hy-
pothesis that the law engages in "selective transmission" strategies to pursue particular
"decision rules"). For example, as Cohen explains, the Indian Penal Code drafted by
Lord Macanley specifically denied the defense of necessity and referred the matter to
the sovereign for a determination of clemency. See id. at 640 n.35 (discussing Macau-
lay's concern that "allowing defenses based on 'the desire of self-preservation' would
be widely abused and would lead people more readily into life-threatening situations").
"Selective transmission" in this sense reflects a desire to limit "legislation" (the asser-
tion of conduct rules) and the perils of execution (selfexemption and ex post facto
determinations). Id.
See Glanville Williams, Provocation and the Reasonable Man, 1954 CRIM. L. REV.
740, 740-42 (raising fundamental questions about the theory of provocation); see also
Victoria Nourse, Passion's Progress: Modern Law Reform and the Provocation Defense, 106
YALE L.J. 1331, 1341-42 (1997) (discussing the "disarray" of ideas of provocation).
See loshuna Dressier, Provocation: PartialJustification or Partial Excuse?, 51 MOD. L.
REV. 467, 467-72 (1988) (describing traditional and modern views of provocation);
Nourse, sup~ra note 104, at 1339 ("[T]he earlier view is roughly associated with the
common law and regards provocation as partial justification.").
106 See LAFAVE, sup+ra note 49, § 7.10 (explaining that discussions of "provocatory
conduct" are actually considerations of reaso nableness).
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voked into passionate homicide."" The quandary that arises, of• 08
course, is whether any killing is "reasonable" in this sense.
Partially in response to these questions, the more modern theories
of provocation have tended to focus on an excuse version of the de-
fense-a version that emphasizes the individual's lack of self-control.
Borrowing concepts from diminished capacity law, for example, the
Model Penal Code's version of provocation seems to have almost
completely jettisoned the justification theory.' ' Instead, the Model
Penal Code provides a partial defense in any case in which the defen-
dant lacked self-control because of "extreme mental or emotional dis-
turbance."'' . Provocation, in its "reform" incarnations, then, has
tended to transform questions that used to be about the reasonable-
ness of provoking conduct into questions of individual psychology and
reasonable minds.'
That provocation falls in the excuse or partial-excuse camp, how-
ever, does not eliminate the possibility of collateral effects. It is not
only the defendant with a weak self-defense claim but also the one
with a weak provocation claim whom critics charge with taking the law
into his own hands. Imagine a defendant who argues that he was
prompted to violence by a passionate response to the unreasonable
1117 See, e.g., Howell v. State, 917 P.2d 1202, 1209 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996) (explain-
ing that Alaska's legislature has codified the "traditional" doctrine of provocation, so
that if a "reasonable person" would have believed the victim had engaged in a serious
provocation, the defendant may be partially justified for his actions); People v. Steele,
47 P.3d 225, 240 (Cal. 2002) (indicating that California's "reasonable person" re-
quirement demands that for the provocation defense to be successftlly invoked, the
objective, reasonable person would have to have been provoked while in the defen-
dant's predicament); Savage v. State, 558 S.E.2d 701, 703 (Ga. 2002) (deciding that a
defendant may only receive a voluntary manslaughter charge when he has demon-
strated that he acted out of passion in response to a provocation that would have
caused a reasonable person to act similarly).
IDS See Williams, sulpra note 104, at 742 (questioning whether any provoked killing
can be held reasonable because reasonable people do not kill).
109 MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 (1980).
HO Id.
III See id. § 210.3 cmt. 5 at 55 (emphasizing the subjectivity of the inquiry Under
section 210.3); id. at 57 (questioning the common law's "confining" doctrine in cate-
gories of provocative conduct); id. at 60-61 (emphasizing that section 210.3 "substan-
tially enlarge[s]" the scope of common law provocation, in part by eliminating catego-
ries and relying on the actor's belief); id at 61-62 ("Most importantly, the Model Code
qualities the rigorous objectivity with which the common law determined adequacy ot
provocation."); id. at 62-63 (emphasizing the relative subjectivity and flexibility of the
Model Penal Code's reference to the actor's "situation"); id. at 63 ("In the end, the
question is whether the actor's loss of self-control can be understood in terms that
arouse sympathy in the ordinary citizen.").
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"nagging" of his wife" or one who claims to have been inspired to kill
by an overwhelming fear of African Americans based on "reasonable
racism.""' As in Goetz or Norman or Dudley & Stephens, the critics'
claims express a fear that the law will embrace the defendants' own
partiality in the guise of a "reasonably" provoking emotion. Put less
colloquially, the fear is that, by permitting such a defense based on
"wifely" nagging or the "natural" aggression of blacks, the law will be
perceived, not simply by defendants, but by the law-abiding, as endors-
ing claims of violence based on "reasonable" emotions that amount to
what the law, in other places, would declare to be sexist or racist. In a
world in which the law embraces these emotions as reasonable, critics
have a right to fear that the law has upended itself and, in effect,
changed the relation between citizens and their government.
If this is right, then it is not enough to view the provocation de-
fense as a reflection of the defendant's individual psychology. The
provocation defense does not rely just upon emotion but upon emo-
tion linked to claims of "reasonableness." Those claims are, in turn,
often borrowed from the normative relations of the parties.
The provocation defense, like self-defense, takes "two"-it takes a
defendant's responding to another person and, in turn, requires, for
its success, that the defendant's claim be embraced by the state. Just
change the relational contexts of the cases and this becomes clearer.
One co-felon nags another about bringing the wrong gun; can the co-
felon claim provocation? We may hope to measure this defendant's
anxious pulses and neural activity but we know that there is no tech-
nology, no internal diagnostic machine, to effect such a result. And in
the absence of such an investigation, we are left to our social re-
sources, relying on our judgments of the facts of "human nature."'II
We judge our squabbling co-felons by norms about their behavior and
their relationships to each other and to the state.
If provocation may elicit fear that the law will embrace relational
norms that elsewhere would clearly be seen as "legislating," it also
112 E.g., People v. Roche, 772 N.E.2d 1133 (N.Y. 2002).
11 Seejody D. Armour, Race lpsa Loquitur: Of Reasonable Racists, Intelligent Bayesians,
and Involuntay Negroplhobes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 781, 782-83 (1994) (discussing a claim of
self-defense based on a claimed reasonable consideration of race).
114 See HART, supra note 4, at 33 (referring to "inferences from 'common-sense'
generalizations about human nature" in proof of provocation). The reference to hu-
man nature is certainly not Hart's alone. This is a rather ancient idea. See HOBBES,
supra note 26, at ch. XXVII, paras. 21-26 (discussing crimes, excuses, and extenuating
circumstances and stating that "Nature ... compels" a person to break a law in some
situations).
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raises precisely the opposite fear-that the state will deny the defense
in an appropriate case. As we have seen above in cases of self-defense
and necessity, there is more than the risk that the defendant will ask
us to embrace a norm-like reasonable racism-that legislates against
the grain. There is, as well, precisely the opposite risk-that the state
will favor the prejudices of the many at the expense of the few. This
does much to explain the oddities of the Model Penal Code's ap-
proach toward provocation. For it is this risk-the risk of majorities
being partial to themselves-that appears to have propelled the draft-
ers toward a focus on individual minds and emotional distress. The
drafters' particular concern was a case involving male sodomy; they
assumed that this would be the kind of claim that a majority might
deny because of homophobia (whether or not the sex was consen-
sual)."' The drafters envisaged the lonely and oppressed defendant
whose claim is rejected by the jury because the defendant or the con-
duct is morally or socially suspect.
There is no question that both of these risks are possible-the risk
of a sympathetic defendant denied a defense or an unsympathetic de-
fendant accorded one. But, in either case, and most importantly for
our purposes, these risks are not based on the defendant's individual-
ity alone. We view these risks in light of the relations apparent in the
case; we view the young boy sodomized by a sadistic older man in a far
different position than the co-felon nagging his co-felon. The drafters
of the Model Penal Code, however, focused on one particular type of
risk (majoritarian bias against minorities) and, on the basis of that
risk, shifted the inquiry toward one of mind and mental disturbance.
In that shift, they created the possibility that the law would, via the
mind, embrace the good with the bad, the man who killed his wife for
nagging and the boy tortured by an older man. For once one refuses
to consider the normative relation of the defendant to the victim or
the state, and is left only with a descriptive account of the defendant's
mind, then almost any defendant's claim of provocation may appear
plausibly "emotional." It is not only Gounagias, but also the man who
MODEl PENAL CODE § 210.3 cnnt. 5 at 59-60 (discussing Stle v. Coua ,gias, 153
P. 9 (Wash. 1915)); see also Bedder v. Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions, I W.L.R. 1119, 1122-23
(Eng. H.L. 1954) (applying the test for provocation as to that of the "mind of a reason-
able man" without consideration of the individual's )articular condition or sensitivity).
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kills someone who parked in his parking space, "  who may appear
emotionally disturbed.
All of this is made more complicated by the fact that, in provoca-
tion, one is not exonerating the defendant but simply mitigating the
charge, which adds another level of analysis. We can see this most
clearly if we consider one of the most sympathetic of provocation
claims-that of the parent who kills the abuser of her child at the mo-
ment she learns of the abuse. We do not worry, in such a case, that
the defendant has sought to impose partial, personal, or prejudiced
norms about the provoking act. Unlike the defendant who kills a
nagging wife or a parking trespasser, the defendant who kills the child
abuser has not flouted majoritarian norms about the provoking act:
The child rape is clearly and gravely wrong in a way that parking and
nagging are not. In her emotion (the outraged response to the rape),
the defendant looks like us. But this cannot excuse the act of killing.
For, in this act, the defendant has avoided the state's monopoly on
violence and dispute resolution-she may not have "legislated" im-
properly, but she has "executed" improperly by killing (rather than
using lawful process to respond to the wrong).
Thus, in a single case, we may say both that the defendant has
acted with and against the many; that she poses little risk of legislating
norms contemptuous of basic social prohibitions (like the rule against
rape) but that she has quite literally taken the execution of the law
into her own hands. A law that failed to recognize the defendant's
reasons (the rape) would seem to make the law better than its citizens
(because it failed to reflect their moral norms) and a law that failed to
punish (the killing) would simply repeat the same error. And so the
law compromises, by reducing the verdict from murder to manslaugh-
ter, upon a showing of emotion so great as to remove the defendant
from the "call of reason" and so sudden that the state could not take
her place.
D. Insanily
I conclude this Part by considering insanity; there is no defense
more clearly understood as an excuse, nor one more clearly focused
116 State v. Raguseo, 622 A.2d 519, 523-25 (Conn. 1993) (describing a defendant
who killed someone who parked in his parking space and then argued on appeal that
the evidence established the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance).
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on individual minds. Insanity is the "hard" case for a theory that es-
chews a focus on psychology and individuality and, instead, urges em-
phasis on the relations of defendants to victims and to the state. And
yet, here too, I believe this approach has explanatory power, particu-
larly when it comes to explaining the great, and increasing, anomalies
of the insanity defense. Throughout the twentieth century, there was
no more politicized, no more amorphous, claim than the insanity de-
fense. The public has repeatedly found in the insanity defense-more
than any other modern criminal law doctrine-cause for concern.""
Academics have joined in this chorus of disapproval, albeit from a dif-
ferent perspective, charging that the insanity defense fails to reflect a
psychologically accurate vision of mind and personality.' 19
The most notorious of the modern insanity cases is the Hinckley
case.' 2 John Hinckley attempted to assassinate President Reagan and
claimed that he did this to continue his imagined relationship with
screen star Jodie Foster. Like many cases involving the insanity de-
fense, Hinckley's trial was one by psychiatrist; when it was over, the
jury concluded that he was insane within the meaning of the law.'2'
The public rebelled, and Congress changed the rules, tightened the
doctrine, and purported to return to the traditional meaning of the
law. 12" As a result of Hinckley, a number of states reformed their insan-
ity defenses, and by 1996 a majority had returned to older formula-
117 See LAFAVE, supra note 49, § 4.1 (b) (describing the purpose of the insanity de-
fense).
Hs See id. § 4.1 (d) (discussing the question of abolishing the insanity defense, a
question typically not raised with respect to other defenses).
H9 See id. § 4.2(c) (noting that the criticism of M'Naghlen-one of the standard in-
sanity measures, see infra note 124 (discussing the rule)-is that the test is "based on an
entirely Obsolete and misleading conception of the nature of insanity" (citation omit-
ted)); see aLso Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 870-71 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (arguing
that the M'Naghlen rule reflects a view inconsistent with the "science of psychiatry").
120 United States v. Hinckley, 525 F. Supp 1342 (1981).
121 See KAI'IAN ET AL. supra note 62, at 745 ("There was conflicting expert testi-
mony on each side, but Hinckley put On persuasive evidence of his psychotic obsession
with Foster and was acquitted.").
122 Id. ("Public opinion polls taken immediately after the Hinckley verdict was an-
nounced indicated that up to 90 percent of those surveyed favored abolishing the in-
sanity defense.... Hinckley's acquittal captted the public attention and focused
lawmakers on the insanity defense to an unprecedented extent.").
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tions of the defense, 2 3 specifically borrowing the seemingly archaic
view known as the M'Naghten rule.
12'
The politics of the insanity defense has yielded an exceedingly
wide split between the academy and doctrinal reality. By the 1960s,
insanity had become the darling of criminal law scholarship.2 "1 Judges
and scholars experimented with rules that attempted to give greater
psychological reality to the defense. The Durham rule, offered by
Judge Bazelon, was exalted by experts for its realism;' 2" the Model Pe-
nal Code's proposal significantly broadened M'Naghten but continued
to be criticized as unrealistic.'27 Judges and scholars repeated over
and over again that the traditional rule-M'Naghten-did not reflect
the actual operation of mind. Oddly enough, even though only two
jurisdictions ever adopted Durham and a minority now follow the
Model Penal Code, the casebooks still teach this narrative of law-gone-
129
wrong.
If my analysis is correct, though, we should consider that we may
be asking the wrong question about the insanity defense-that our fo-
cuIs on individual minds has occluded a different question. What, af-
ter all, is the attraction of M'Naghten? M'Naghen demands that the de-
123 See id. at 732 n.15 (stating that "[a]s of 1996 a ni iority of states were using a
M 'iVaghten-based test").
121 M'Naghte 's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 719 (H.L. 1843), states that sanity should be
presumed and insanity requires proof that the defendant did not know the nature of
his act or that the act was wrong.
125 See, e.g., Caleb Foote, A Comment on Pre-Ttial Commitment of Ciminal I)efendants,
108 U. PA. L. REV. 832, 832-46 (1960) (exploring pretrial insanity and a federal com-
mitment statute); Richard H. Kuh, The Isanity Dfese-Ain Eff to Cobie Law and
Reason, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 771, 772 (1962) (suggesting that insanity issues are improp-
erly givent1 toirhy deliberation in light of current knowledge in psychiatry).
See LAFAvE, supra note 49, § 4.3(b) ("The psychiatrisLs, generally, applatided
the [Durham] decision.").
127 See id. § 4.3(e) (noting criticisms that the AlI test failed to "'bridge the gap that
now exists between legal and psychiatric thinking' (quoting HENRY WEll IOFEN, TiHE
URGE TO PUNISH: NEW AIPPROACHES TO T- PROBLEM OF MENTAL IRRESPONSIIBILITY
FOR CRIME 100 (1957))).
129 See, e.g., United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 976-79 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (re-
peating the standard psychological criticisms of M'Naghten); StIEI DON GIUECK, LAW &
PSYCHIATFRY: COLD WAR OR ENIANTE COItI)IA/1? 48 (1962) ("M'Naghlten proceeds upon
... questionable assumptions of an outworn era in mental medicine .... Not only is
the famoIUs test vague and tincertain, and not only does it embalm outtworn medical
notions, btti . . . it is also too narrow a measure of irresponsibility."); ABRAHIAM S.
GOLDSTEIN, TilE INSANI'IY DEFENSE 46-47 (1967) (explaining that, at the ime, critics
of M'Naghten tended to "dominate the debate. The picture they present is that of a
restrictive rule which reflects an outmoded ftculty psychology," and "denies to thejuty
the 'insights of modern psychology"').
129 E.g., KAPLAN ET AL., supra note 62, at 734-38.
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fendant show either that she was completely unable to appreciate real-
ity at the time of the crime (the venerable claim that the victim was
simply a lemon) or that he could not appreciate the wrongfulness of
his actions.""" Now, if one simply wanted to narrow the insanity de-
fense to a bare minimum, to restrict its import for fear of abuse, one
would simply leave the defense to the first prong--require that the de-
fendant was incapable of appreciating reality. But that is not the doc-
trine; instead, M'Naghten allows the defendant to argue that he knew
what he was doing-killing a person-but could not appreciate its
wrongfulness."'
The normative quality of M'Naghten is what has disturbed mental
health experts and tended to focus the critique on M'Naghten's unreal-
istic description of mind. But what if M'Naghten is not intended to be
about mind alone? What if it is about the relation of the defendant to
the law-abiding and the state? Recourse to the risks we have seen
above can help to explain widespread affection for an otherwise ap-
parently irrational doctrine. Consider the risk of legislation-the fear
that insanity is some kind of unreasoning reason that, if accepted,
would put the state at the mercy of those with beliefs the state denies.
Put differently, the fear is that "insanity" arguments are simply manu-
factured excuses for bad norms (for homophobia or imagined rejec-
tion or love of violence) . From such a perspective, the issue of con-
trol and volition (often lauded as the principal difference between
modern and ancient insanity formulations), recedes before the risk of
undermining majoritarian norms; since, if one is worried about coun-
termajoritarian norms, one worries less about whether or not there is
130 Kaplan, Weisberg, and Binder explain:
The M'Naghlen rule... tells jurors simply "that every man is to be presumed to
be sane, and ... that to establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must
be clearly proved that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party ac-
cused was labouring under such a defect of reason, fiom disease of the mind,
as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did
know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong."
Id. at 732 (quoting M'Naghtens Case, 8 Eng. Rep. at 722).
131 Indeed, it is precisely this characteristic that has elicited criticism from psychia-
trists. See LAFAVE, supra note 49, § 4.2(c)(3) ("A common objection among psychia-
trisLs to the right-wrong test is that it is directed to ethical and moralistic rather than
scientific concerns.").
132 For an account emphasizing such fears, see the discussion of fears of homo-
phobia and the Dan White case in GEORGE P. FI.ETCHER, WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME:
PROTECTING VIcTIMs' RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS 15-18 (1996).
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control than why one has lost control.' : In a world of such fears,
M'Naghten's normative and cognitive elements make a good deal of
sense: the defendant who cannot appreciate social and legal norms
cannot be seen as "legislating." He has no reason at all, where reason
is defined as a wish to impose bad norms; the "right or wrong" test
aims to ensure that he has no normative judgment at all.
Importantly, however, the normative component of MNaghten
does double duty: it not only restricts the claims of defendants but
also restricts the power of the state. A defendant who cannot appreci-
ate legal and social norms-as MNaghten provides-not only cannot
legislate, she cannot be judged according to prevailing norms. A state
that would punish the insane (in the MNaghten sense) would clearly
act "above" its own citizens-it would apply a standard of judgment
that the citizen could not. If punishment is legitimated at least in part
based on majoritarian norms, a state that punishes someone who can-
not appreciate these norms punishes for no reason. The state sacri-
fices the minority (the defendant) in the name of no principle; it pun-
ishes for disability alone.
The point of this discussion is not to valorize MNaghten. Rather, it
is to emphasize that there may be more at stake in the insanity defense
than simply mind, mental structure, or psychology. However much we
may want to remit questions of insanity to experts, a normative view of
the defense has been surprisingly resilient. This resilience may reflect
less about the nature of minds than it does about the collateral effects
of the defense. For example, the defendant who harms others when
insane differs from other defendants not only in psychology but also
in the relations she creates. The defendant who kills thinking that she
is squeezing a lemon expresses no contempt for her victim; she makes
no claim of aristocracy-that she deserved life while the victim did
not."M Similarly, she makes no claim to take the law into her own
hands for she does not, and cannot, understand that law.
3 5
And yet, if we imagine a world in which the state routinely pun-
ishes the insane, we would easily complain that the state had departed
1143 The issue is not, then, cognition versus control but, instead, limiting both to
avoid risk of embracing countermajoritarian norms-whether one adopts a control or
a co nition test.
On the question of contempt and[ the notion of superiority as implicit in our
blaming practices, see jean Hampton, The Rehibulive Idea, in FORGIVENESS AND MERCY
111, 124-30 (Jeffrie G. Murphy &.]ean Hampton eds., 1988).
35 On defiance as a component of mens rea, see Jean Hampton, Mens Rea, Soc.
P111'. & POL'Y, Spring 1990, at 1.
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from its commitments to protect the weak as well as the strong. For
the state to punish the insane is like the state that punishes the self-
defender with no other recourse; in neither case is the state available
to the defendant, in the first case because of the speed of the knife
and in the second because of incapacity of mind. And, as we have
learned above, where there is no alternative law-abiding mode, to
punish the defendant comes very close to punishing the innocent.
Whether or not M'Naghten then amounts to a realistic or even appro-
priate view of mind, it should stand as a floor below which a truly re-
publican state should not go. If this is the logic of the argument, it is
not, of course, its resolution. If my approach is right, then the insan-
ity defense represents the state's commitment to a particular vision of
consenting citizens and their relations to one another. M'Naghlen may
well be criticized for failing to provide a realistic standard for minimal
participation in the community, but that is a decidedly different criti-
cism than the one traditionally made.
Insanity bears the marks of the law-abiding in ways similar to what
I have tried to show throughout this Part. My argument has been that
the doctrine of defenses is constructed as much to avoid private pun-
ishment ("taking the law into one's own hands") as it is to reflect a
particular view of defendants' individual character or choice or self-
control. This is manifested nowhere more clearly than the standard
requirement of defenses that the state be unavailable-a requirement
that demands deference to the state's monopoly on violence. For ex-
ample, the doctrine of self-defense insists that the threat be so immi-
nent as to prevent lawful recourse and often emphasizes this fact by
requiring retreat. 1"i The doctrine of necessity requires that the defen-
dant cannot take the law into her own hands-that the protester, for
example, must assert her claims before the legislature.1 37 Similarly,
duress in many formulations' demands that, if there is an alternative,
if the police may be called, that the defendant loses her claim of coer-
cion. Provocation does not yield acquittal but only mitigates precisely
because no emotion, however grave or consistent with the law, can
eliminate the defendant's evasion of the state's monopoly on vio-
l36 See supra text accompanying notes 67-70 (discussing imminence).
137 See supra text accompanying notes 84-87 (discussing the "alternatives" require-
ment in necessity law).
138 See State v. Crawford, 861 P.2d 791, 799 (1993) (finding evidence of compul-
sion insufficient to make out a claim of duress because "the required element of an
imminent threat is missing, the compulsion is not continuous, and there were oppor-
tunities for escape").
1725
1726 UNIVEASITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWIM VIEW [Vol. 151:1691
lence. ' Finally, even insanity, that darling of excuse, depends in
some of its most resilient forms upon the notion that the state is un-
available; that it provides no call to the reason of the defendant; that
even if the policeman were at her elbow, the insane defendant would
do the same. If this is right, then we must do better than assume that
defenses are only reflections of individual defendants' characters or
choices or emotional self-control. These latter concerns may be nec-
essary but they are not sufficient to explain the criminal law of de-
fenses that we have.
III. THE PARADOX OF INDIVIDUALIZATION
At this point, it is time to reflect and respond to the inevitable ob-
jections. Some will find my approach uncomfortable and challenge it
as "illiberal." They will insist that defenses are about individuals and
are necessary exceptions to the general social goals of crime control.
Indeed, I do differ from this view; I have offered accounts of defenses
that do not rest solely upon individuality and do not claim to be "ex-
ceptions" to general ends, but instead reflect the law's collateral ef-
fects, including the demands of majorities and the state. At the same
time, I believe the charge of illiberalism to be mistaken, and, in this
Part, I confront that objection, arguing that defenses should be placed
on stronger majoritarian ground. First, I explain that what has often
appeared as the "liberal" solution to criminal justice problems may
not be as "liberal" as many have hoped-that the idea that we best pro-
tect defendants by individualization may actually lead to the very op-
pression that we had hoped to avoid; indeed, it may implant the state
within the hearts and minds of individuals. Second, I argue that, if
one is looking for a liberal political theory, principles of anti-self-
exemption are far more instructive, and far more grounded in tradi-
tional liberal political thought, than the hyperindividualism that has
so influenced the definition of what is "liberal" in the criminal law."(
A. Rethinking Individualization
For some time, criminal law scholarship has been propelled by an
offstage moral narrative, a story of the lonely individual pitted against
139 See sulira text accompai*ying note 116 (discussing provocation and the judg-
ment about emotion versus the judgment about killing).
110 See STEPHEN HOLMES, TH-E ANATOMY OF ANTILIBERAuIsM 237-40 (1993) (dis-
cussing the "self-exemption taboo" of liberal thought). This is also the position, I be-
lieve, of Hannah Arendt. ARENDT, ON VIOLENCE, supra note 59, at 97.
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a hostile community. From the middle of the 1950s through the
1980s, this story came to yield a seeming orthodoxy that individualiza-
tion was the hallmark of a just criminal law.14 As one commentator
has put it, one of the "central tenets" of liberal philosophy of the
1970s was the "idea that the defendant should get as much individual-
ized (subjective) justice as possible.""2 Indeed, in part because of the
path-breaking work of H.L.A. Hart,"" it once seemed as if a large por-
tion of the literature on negligence, self-defense, and provocation was
devoted to the question of how "individualized" the reasonable person
should be.",4 This movement reached its height with proposals for de-
fenses based on rotten social backgrounds and the transformation of
general rules into more particularized syndromes."'
By the end of the century, however, the pendulum had swung the
other way. Although individualization remained a central background
norm in theoretical debates,'4 6 there was growing concern that this
141 The relevant literature ranges from the philosophical, see HART, supra note 4, at
158-85, to the philosophically minded, see Moore, supra note 78, at 1091-95, 1128-49, to
the more doctrinal, see Paul H. Robinson, Rules of Conduct and Principles of Adjudication,
57 U. Ciii. L. REV. 729 (1990).
142 Doriane Lamnbelet Coleian, IndividualizingJustice Through Multicnlturalism: The
Liberals'Dilemma, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1095 (1996).
143 For a discussion of Hart's negligence theory, see HART, supra note 4, at 136-57;
on Hart's influence and the importance of individualization to the 'justice" of the
criminal law, see David A.J. Richards, Introduction to Symposium, Self-Defense and Rela-
tions of Domination: Moral and Legal Perspectives on Battered Women Who Kill, 57 U. Prn'.
L. REV. 461, 461-62 (1996).
144 The questions enumerated in casebooks of the 1970s and 1980s display this
legacy, focusing as they so often do on how we characterize the "reasonable person," or
how subjective our approach toward individual defenses should be. These issues tend
to arise anywhere a "reasonable person" standard arises. In the criminal law, this cov-
ers a good deal of territory from negligence to self-defense to provocation. See, e.g.,
KADISH & SCIFULICOFER, supra note 81, at 445-56 (discussing the question of individu-
alization in a section on the "reasonable person requirement" as applied to provoca-
tion); KAPLAN ET AL., supra note 62, at 441-45 (same); id. at 635 (discussing how indi-
viduated the reasonable person standard should be in the context of self-defense).
145 For a discussion of mitigation based on disadvantaged background, see David
L. Bazelon, The Morality of the Criminal Law, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 385 (1976); Richard
Delgado, "Rotten Social Background": Should the Criminal Law Recognize a Defense of Severe
Environmental Deprivation?, 3 LAw & INEQ. 9 (1985). For a rejection of such a defense,
see George Vuoso, Note, Background, Responsibility, and Excuse, 96 YALE L.J. 1661, 1661-
62 (1987). On the evolution of various excuses, see Stephen J. Morse, Excusing and the
New Excuse Defenses: A Legal and Conceptual Review, 23 CRIME &JUST. 329 (1998).
146 See Richards, supra note 143 at 464 ("[0] nly ... individualization can assure the
basic demand of fairness that normative ,equirements are framed and applied in ways
that persons could reasonably be expected to conform to.").
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approach could lead to abuse.' 7 Critics wanted to locate a set of
"bad/abusive" excuses, but offered no clear way to divide the good
from the bad.",8 Had the abuse excuse critics taken their position to
its logical end, they would have run headlong into problems with the
principle of individualization; for the more the law acquires the char-
acteristics of the defendant, the more the law appears to prefer the
defendant to the rest of society.
In the end, the abuse excuse debate punctured the existing con-
sensus but obscured a very different problem with individualization.
There is no question but that hyperindividualization may go too far to
protect individuals. But it is also true that it may not go far enough to
protect individuals. Although intended to be more humane and to
sequester the individual from the state, hyperindividualization may
backfire, rendering the state invisible--even where it is most obviously oppres-
sive. This is what I call the "paradox of individualization."
To see the paradox, let us begin with Martin v. State," a case in
which the defendant was found "drunk in public." We know, how-
ever, that Martin did not go out in public on his own but, instead, was
dragged out of his house by the police.' "' The standard pedagogical
approach to this case invites discussion of the nature of an individual's
voluntary, willed action.'' Notice, however, that all of this attention to
Martin's personal, individualized ability to act helps to occlude an-
other very important issue: the defendant's relation to the state. In-
deed, casebooks try to write the state (the police's conduct) out of the
147 See, e.g., ALAN M. DERSIIowrrz, THE ABUSE EXCUSE AND OTHER COP-OUTS, SOB
STORIES, AND EVASIONS OF RESPONSIBILriY 3 (1994) (calling the abuse excuse a "li-
cense to kill and maim"). But see JAMES Q. WILSON, MORAL JUDGMENT: DOES THE
ABUSE EXCUSE THREATEN OUR LEGAL SYSTEM? 23-24 (1997) (arguing that public fear
of the abuse excuse is overstated, but the law has become too subjective).
1 See Victoria Nourse, The New Normativity: The Abuse Excuse and the Resurgence of
Judgnent in the Criminal Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1435, 1441-56 (1998) (book review)
(finding the distinction between abusive and legitimate excuses still elusive).
14' 17 So. 2d 427, 427 (Ala. Ct. App. 1944).
150 Id.
151 See, e.g., KADISII & SCI-ULIOFER, supra note 81, at 174-75, 180-81 (asking ques-
tions designed to test whether the defendant committed a "voluntary" act); see also
Mark Kelman, Intepretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN L. REV.
591, 592 (1981) ("[l]ssues of the voluntariness of a defendant's conduct can be re-
solved only after we have agreed, for reasons outside of our rational discourse, to in-
clude within the relevant time frame some obviously voluntary act that contributes to
the ultimate harm.").
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case by positing a different set of facts.'5 But, assuming that we are
sticking to the actual facts of Martin, one wonders why the police are
irrelevant. 153
The point here is to see that our attention to individualized no-
tions of voluntariness already assumes the state out of the picture. By
focusing our attention on voluntariness as a feature of individual con-
duct (as opposed to the defendant's relation to the state), we have
chosen a particular level of analysis. We have chosen to ignore the in-
stitutional effects of the case. Put in other words, we have neglected
the effect of the case's holding on the institution of punishment. For
such an inquiry, the state's relation to the defendant is clearly rele-
vant-if not essential. Put bluntly: would it be legitimate for the state
to "create" the crime of "public nudity" by pulling naked people out
of their beds and bringing them into the street? The state that "cre-
ates" crime is certainly not one that any of us wants and that is why the
law has created entrapment rules-not for defendants but for the rest of
'US.
Once we focus on the defendant's relation to the state, other cases
and problems begin to take on a new cast. Consider State v. Norman,' 5"
a case discussed above about a battered woman who killed her sleep-
ing husband. :' :5 The standard debate about Norman (and indeed
about most battered woman self-defense cases) is often characterized
as a question of the reasonableness of her views of imminence or per-
ception of harm. This, in turn, yields insistent questions about
whether we should apply a subjective or objective standard in self-
defense law, a question focused on individualization. The only prob-
lem with all of this is that, just as in Martin, the intellectual focus on
the individual tends to divert us from the state's role. The police's ac-
152 See KAPLAN ET AL., supra note 62, at 137 (suggesting that it should not matter
that the defendant was taken out of the house by the police by posing a hypothetical in
which the defendant is thrown out by a private party).
153 One might argue that the relevant "act" was "disturbing the public peace,"
which occurred only "after" the police dragged the defendant out of the house and
that this was an "independent" act and crime. That does not eliminate the state's role
in the case-or resolve the entrapment question-since the relevant inquiry would still
be whether the police's conduct "caused" the crime. That there is an "act" does not
mean that the state may always punish that act; entrapment assumes that a crime has
been committed. The ultimate question is whether the state "created" the criminal
conduct-and that depends upon a causal determination. See Sorrells v. United States,
287 U.S. 435, 451 (1932) ("The government may not punish an individual "for an al-
leged offense which is the product of the creative activity of its own officials.").
154 378 S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1989).
155 Supra text accompanying notes 63-74.
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tions toward Norman were real; they were not simply part of her per-
ception. The police came and insisted that she sign a warrant (a prac-
tice not likely to be the case in many states today) and they witnessed a
felony threat (to let Norman "die") and yet did nothing. These facts
were not and cannot be resigned to Norman's individual conscious-
ness; they did not happen in her mind. They are a matter of state re-
sponsibility that, for all of our talk about individualization, tend to be
ignored in the standard literature.
Finally, let us turn to the rather well-known case of the Williams
family, charged with child neglect and negligent homicide for the
death of their baby.1' Again, this is a case taught in almost every
criminal law course in the country and, on the doctrine and the result,
is a legitimately hard case. But it is a case that is universally regarded
as raising primarily a problem of individualization-questions about
how we define the reasonable person and whether that definition
should require actual knowledge of a serious risk of death.157 The case
is thought, with some apparent condescension, to raise the question
whether we should define the reasonable person as a Native American
or simply a poorly educated person (in other words, like someone
other than the students reading the case). The standard question
thus presented is about individualization: do we take account of the
defendants' background? Their education? The fact that they live on
a reservation?"
8
As in Martin and Norman, the conventional focus on the character-
istics of the Williams defendants tends to occlude the role of the state
by embedding it within the mind of the reasonable person. The Wil-
liams parents claimed that they did not take their baby to the doctor
during the short window of time during which the baby could have
been saved' t"' because they were afraid that the authorities would take
156 State v. Williams, 484 P.2d 1167, 1174 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971).
157 See, e.g., Samuel H. Pillsbury, Ctimes of hIdiference, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 105, 195
(1996) (discussing the "individualization dilemma" as "whether the reasonable person
personifies a universal standard or whether this fictional construct should be invested
with some of the characteristics of the accused"). The question in Williamns thus be-
comes, as PillsbU-y puts it, "should the defendants' actions be compared to a person of
reasonable prudence, or to a reasonably prudent Native American with less than a full
high school education?" /d. at 195. Pillsbury recognizes that this inquiry, even if
amended by H.L.A. Hart's capacity test, "misses a vital issue: the affirmative reason for
the Williamses' inaction." Id. at 197.
158 d. at 195.
159 There was a five-day window of opportunity in which, had they taken the baby
to the doctor, he could have been helped. Defendants believed that the child was suf-
fering from a simple toothache and they administered aspirin to address the problem.
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their baby away." ' When one first encounters this defense, it sounds
like a desperate plea of otherwise rather selfish parents. It was not,
however, that the Williamses were ignorant. To the contrary, the Wil-
liamses were scared-and they had good reasons to be scared. During
this period, perhaps as many as one-third of Indian children were
taken away from their parents by state authorities.'' Congress ulti-
mately acknowledged these practices, including the assumption of
some social workers that living on an Indian reservation was not a
proper place" for a child to grow up. One need not conclude from
this that the Williamns parents were above reproach or that their actions
In fact, the tooth would become infected and gangrenous, accounting for the "bluish"
color oil the cheek. See Williams, 484 P.2d at 1174 ("Accordingly, the baby's apparent
condition between September 1 and September 5, 1968 became the critical period for
the purpose of determining whether in the exercise of ordinary caution defendants
should have provided medical care for the minor child.").
160 Defendant husband testified that "the way the cheek looked,... and that
stuff on his hair, they would think we were neglecting him and take him away
from us and not give him back." Defendant wife testified that the defendants
were "waiting for the swelling to go down," and also that they were afraid to
take the child to a doctor for fear that the doctor would report them to the
welfare department, who, in turn, would take the child away. "It's just that I
was so scared of losing him." They testified that they had heard that the de-
fendant husband's cousin lost a child that way.
Id. at 1174.
161 Surveys of States with large Indian populations conducted by the Associa-
tion on American Indian Affairs (AAIA) in 1969 and again in 1974 indicate
that approximately 25-35 percent of all Indian children are separated from
their families and placed in foster homes, adoptive homes, or institutions ....
The disparity in placement rates for Indian[s] and non-Indians is shock-
ing .... In the State of Washington, the Indian adoption rate is 19 times
greater and the foster care rate 10 times greater [than for non-Indians, i.e. In-
dian children are much more likely to be taken from their families than other
children.]
William Byler, Removing Children: The Destruction of Ametican Indian Families, C.R. DIG.,
Summer 1977, at 19, 19. Moreover, Indians are usually placed with non-Indian foster
care or adoptive families. See id. at 20 (noting a survey of sixteen states that found that
approximately "85 percent of all Indian children in foster homes were living in non-
Indian homes").
1,2 In judging the fitness of a particular family, many social workers, ignorant
of Indian culttral values and social norms ... frequently discover neglect or
abandonment where none exists. For example, the dynamics of Indian ex-
tended families are largely misunderstood. An Indian child may have scores
of, perhaps more than a hundred, relatives who are counted as close, respon-
sible members of the family. Many social workers ... consider leaving the
child with persons outside the nuclear family as neglect and thus as grounds
for terminating parental rights.
Id. at 20. In one case, "social workers asserted that, although they had no evidence
that the mother was unfit, it was their belief that al Indian reservation is all Unsuitable
environment for a child." Id. at 22.
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should not be condemned. After all, the child's life must come before
the parents' relation to the child. Yet the state's conduct is unsettling
in a way similar to that in Martin-the state appears to be prosecuting
defendants for a situation that the state itself may have helped to cre-
ate." ' At the very least, it seems relevant to ask-although the ques-
tion is rarely raised-why the state prosecuted these parents.
The principle of individualization helps to occlude these ques-
tions by placing facts about the state and the defendant's relation to
the state within the minds of the defendants themselves-and then asks
whether these are the minds of "reasonable persons."'"' But is this the
only place where these facts belong? Is it really a "liberal" theory of
the criminal law that asks us whether these people are "like us"? Isn't
there a real problem here in that the state was taking away babies be-
cause they thought these parents "lesser" in some way? My point is
not that these facts exonerate, but that they raise important questions
about something more than how we "describe" the Williamses' indi-
vidual minds, psychology, or background. One need not go further
than the entrapment defense to recognize that ajust relation between
a citizen and state may require that the state acknowledge its own par-
ticipation in crime and that such participation recommends leniency
or mitigation."
Indeed, what becomes clear by the time we take a look at Williams
is how, in a world where we focus on describing defendants, we can
end up with a description that actually deforms individuality. In Martin,
Norman, and Williams, the state is quite literally put into the defen-
dant's mind or body. We are taught, and continue to teach, that it is
the defendant's perceptions or actions that are central to these cases
and that it is only through the defendant's characteristics or character
that the state's actions are comprehended. We ask, for example,
whether the Williamses' or Norman's perceptions of the situation
163 My claim should not be read as a call for a "the state made me do it" defense
(beyond where entrapment law would already apply). I do think, however, that there
are grounds for questioning why these prosecutions were brought and that such ques-
tions are quite important.
1 4 The child neglect statute in Williams required "willful" neglect, a point often
omitted fiom casebook reprints. The Williamses' lawyer certainly would have wanted
to argue that the defendants were hardly willful, where that means defiant of commu-
nity norms; they were simply afraid. On defiance and mens rea, see Hampton, supra
note 135, at I.
165 Cf Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 553-54 (1992) ("When the
[g]overnment's quest for convictions leads to the apprehension of an otherwise law-
abiding citizen who, if left to his own devices, likely would have never run afoul of the
law, the courts should intervene.").
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were reasonable, not whether the state's relation to these defendants
merited a prosecution. We ask whether Martin's actions were in fact
voluntary, willed bodily movements, not whether the state's relation to
him caused the criminal act. The state's actions thus become a fea-
ture or a characteristic of individuality. Can there be a greater perver-
sion of the notion of individualization than the idea that the state has
become embedded in the defendant's mind or body?
The potential paradox of individualization may now be stated in
its most extreme form. Protecting defendants is not the same as de-
scribing them; protecting them means enforcing a just relation be-
tween the state and the defendant. Currently, our only option in a
crudely descriptive, hyperindividualistic world appears to be to
pathologize defendants, to render them sick, insane, or somehow sub-
ject to special rules for special classes. The poor town drunk, poor
battered woman, and the poor ill-educated Native American: they are
sick and all good liberals should have compassion. But this kind of
condescension, however wrapped up in kindness, risks blindness to
oppressive relations. The problem with individualization is not sim-
ply that some excuses may be abused; the problem with individualiza-
tion is that it may not be enough to protect individuals from a world
of real inequality and bias-inequality and bias that do not exist simply
in the minds or bodies of defendants.
I have no quarrel with the notion that individualization is neces-
sary; my quarrel is with the idea that it is sufficient. Individualization
leaves many questions simply unanswered and unanswerable. How
many times are we to be asked about "which characteristics count" for
the reasonable person in provocation, negligence, and self-defense
cases when we have long known that such a question cannot be an-
swered? 17 At least some of the time when we ask the "character or
characteristics" question, we do so because we smell a rat; we sense
that there is a problem in the case. The problem, though, as we have
seen, may not be about an individual but instead about his relation to
others or the state (it may be about the police pulling someone out of
a house, taking away children, or failing to arrest).
W6 See, e.g., MACKINNON, supra note 73, at 243 (decrying antifeminism as a "sys-
tematic relegation of an entire people to a condition of inferiority ... attributed to
them, made a feature of theirs...").
16,7 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 cmt. 5 at 62-63 (1980) (explaining that the
Code's reference, in provocation cases, to the reasonable person in the actor's "situa-
tion" is "designedly ambiguous" and arguing that the proper factors or characteristics
for assessing the "reasonable person" in the "situation" cannot be "resolved satisfacto-
rily by abstract definition").
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There are obvious costs to such an intellectual strategy: once the
state's actions are embedded within the defendant's mind, questions
of state-imposed inequalities simply disappear. Thus, if we think that
the only real question in Martin is "willed bodily movement," we will
not ask why the police picked him, of all people. If we think the only
real question in Norman is her "perception" of the situation, her "syn-
drome," or her failure to respond to an "imminent" threat, we will pay
no attention to the police officer's reasons for failing to arrest. If we
think that the only real question in Williams is whether the defen-
dants' education should "count" as a characteristic, then we will not
ask why the state prosecuted at all. In a world in which individualiza-
tion alone is the only question one thinks necessary to ask, then one is
committed to embedding questions about inequality into the minds
and bodies of defendants.
.B. Traditional Political Theory and the Criminal Law
If this theory is right, then it should quiet those who believe that,
by invoking the name of tie state, or the relation of the defendant to
the state, I have undermined the cause of individuals or their rights. I
mean no such thing. I mean, instead, to add to the ways in which we
may begin to think about protecting individuality. Thinking in new
ways, however, is difficult. And there will be those who will be
tempted to insist that my emphasis on relation "adds" a political the-
ory to the criminal law or encourages an anti-individualistic illiberal-
ism. My response is that I have added nothing that cannot be found
in rather traditional liberal political theory. Thus, whether or not one
adopts such a theory, it seems difficult to conclude that a focus on the
defendant's relation to the state is, by itself, illiberal.
For some, the very idea of invoking the state may offend. For
them, the very term "state" may sound so oppressive as to obliterate
the individual. My answer is to express urgent agreement and dis-
agreement simultaneously. Yes, the state may be oppressive, and, yes,
the merger of the individual into the state is the very definition of tyr-
anny. Indeed, this was the hallmark of twentieth-century totalitarian
political philosophy. " " But what I am urging is precisely the opposite of
, For example, Hannah Arendt discusses how "total terror," which she views as
the essence of totalitarian government, "press[es] men against each other ... [and]
destroys the space between them." HANNAH ARENI)T, THE ORIGINS OF
TO'I'ALITARIANISM 466 (new ed. 1973). By destroying this space, tyranny eliminates
both the individuality of the subject and the space of fieedom between the subject and
the state. /d.
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such a merger. It is not the eradication of a healthy relation between
citizen and state, but instead, attention to that relation. I do not want to
close what Hannah Arendt called the space between individuals, or
between them and the state.'" I want to keep that space; I simply want
to make it clear that we are arguing less about an empty space than a dynamic,
human relation.
That I have called this space a "relation" may raise different kinds
of fears. For some, it will be the fear that I am trying to smuggle
something frighteningly "feminist" into the criminal law without avow-
ing it. And, yes, there is a sense in which the word "relational" might
connote a particular kind of cultural feminism.' 7 But that is not the
sense in which I am using the term here. For those afraid of the idea
of "relation," it is important to remember that the notion of a relation
is, in law, at least as traditional as Hohfeld, Black, and Macaulay. 7'
And, contrary to conventional wisdom, there is plenty of traditional
liberal political philosophy that depends upon ajust relation between
individual and state. Open Montesquieu's The Spirit of the Laws and
you will find immediate reference to laws as "necessary relations.
Indeed, the focus of much of The Spirit of the Laws is on the relations
between "the governors and the governed" (laws of political right)
and those between "members of society... as they stand in relation to
each other" (laws of civil right)."v3 ' These, of course, are the very rela-
tions we have seen above.1
74
119 d.
17' The work of Robin West and Mary Becker is often associated with "relational"
feminism. On the question of the meaning of relational feminism, see Symposium,
Feminist Theories of Relation in the Shadow of the Law, 17 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. I (2002). For
good examples of the debate on the consequences and meaning of relational femi-
nism within political theory, compare Jennifer Nedelsky, Violence Against Women: Chal
lenges to the Liberal State and Relational Feminism, in POLITICAL ORDER: NOMOS XXXVIII
454 (lan Shapiro & Russell Hardin eds., 1996), with Robert Goodin, Stnilctures f Politi-
cal Order: The Relational Feminist Alternatives, in POLITICAL ORDER: NOMOS XXXVIII,
sup/na, at 498.
71 See BLACK, supra note 43 (Using relations between governmental structures to
describe our Constitttion); Wesley Newcomb HoldirI, Some Fundamental Legal Concep-
tions as Applied injudicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913) (disaggregating righLs into
an elaborate set of relations of opposites and correlatives); Stewart Macaulay, Non-
Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminaty Study, 28 AM. Soc. REV. 55 (1963) (study-
ing the ways in which long-term relationships affect our understanding of real-life con-
tracting).
172 "Laws, in their most general signification, are the necessary relations arising
from the nature of things." MONTESQUIEU, supra note 27, at 1.
173 Id. at 5. After discussing the various relations of laws to the people, Montes-
quieU concludes:
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There are those who will continue to insist that I have given up
the great liberal concern for the individual by equating structural
concerns with the lonely individual. But this step, I will insist, is far
from my creation. Violence poses some of the most fundamental
questions of liberal political theory and has, for two centuries, stood as
the centerpiece of theorizing about the state. Open up your Locke
again, if you do not care to focus on Montesquieu, and what do you
find? Locke begins The Second Treatise of Government with the problem
of violence, emphasizing the ways in which violence may corrupt a
polity that aims toward equality and self-government. 175 A state of na-
ture is one, he tells his reader, of perfect equality, in which there is no
aristocracy or monarchy, in which man is "born to all the same advan-
tages of nature," subject to no "subordination or subjection. 1 6 It is
violence that yields subordination: "[T]here cannot be supposed any
such subordination among us, that may authorize us to destroy an-
other, as if we were made for one anothers uses as the inferior ranks
of creatures are for ours."'7 7 The assertion of force amounts to a "state
of war," dependency, and even slavery.1
7
1
This is what I have undertaken to perform in the following work. These rela-
tions I shall examine, since all these together constitute what I call the Spirit
of the Laws.
I have not separated the political from the civil institutions, as I do not pre-
tend to treat of laws, hut of their spirit; and as this spirit consists in the various
relations which the laws may bear to different objects, it is not so much my
business to follow the natural order of laws as that of these relations and ob-
jects.
Id. at 7.
174 Locke also conceives of laws and reason as, in essence, "ties" between men. See,
e.g., LOCKE, supra note 56, at ch. 3, para. 16 ("[B]ecause such men are not tinder the
ties of the common law of reason, [they] have no other rule, but that of force and vio-
lence .... ).
175 See id. at ch. 2 (describing violence and the state of nature).
176 (d. at ch. 2, para. 4. Locke writes:
A state also of equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no
one having more than another; there being nothing more evident than that
creatures of the same species and rank, promliscuotusly born to all the same
advantages of nature and the use of the same faculties, should also be equal
one amongst another without stibordination or subjection .
Md.; see also id. at ch. 2, para. 6 ("[A]nd reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind,
who will but consult it that, being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm
another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions.").
177 id. at ch. 2, para. 6.
178 This, in the end, is the argument Locke makes against monarchy. The mon-
arch who
attempts to get another man into his absolute power, does thereby put himself
into a state of war with him .... [H]e who would get me into his power with-
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Very quickly, the problem of violence poses structural risk.1
7
'9
Locke tells us that: "[I]n transgressing the law of nature, the Of-
fender declares himself to live by another rule than that of reason ....
[H]e becomes dangerous to Mankind," not only because he has bro-
ken the idea of natural equality, but also "the tie [to others], which is
to secure them from injury and violence.""' But this risk of legislation
is not the only risk, nor is it the most serious-there is also the risk of
execution. To protect themselves, men in the state of nature may "pun-
ish the transgressors of that law to such a degree as may hinder its vio-
lation.' 8 1' "[S]elf-love will make men partial to themselves and their
friends, ... [and] ill nature, passion, and revenge will carry them too
far in punishing others.'
The implicit equation here between violence, governance and
inequality is not unique to the work of Locke; indeed, the equation
out my consent would use me as he pleased ... and destroy me, too, when he
had a fancy to it; for nobody can desire to have me in his absolute power, un-
less it be to compel me by force to that which is against the right of my free-
dom, i.e. make me a slave.
Id. at ch. 3, para. 17.
179 Locke describes the state of war that proceeds from violence:
To be free from such force is the only security of my preservation; and reason
bids me look on him as an enemy to my preservation who would take away
that freedom which is the fence to it; so that he who makes an attempt to enslave
me thereby puts himself into a state of war with me. He that, in the state of
nature, would take away thefreedoni that belongs to any one in that state must
necessarily be supposed to have a design to take away everything else, that free-
dom being the foundation of all the rest; as he that, in the state of society,
would take away the freedom belonging to those of that society or common-
wealth must be supposed to design to take away friom them evetthing else,
and so be looked on as in a state of )ar1
Id.
18() Id. at ch. 2, para. 8; see also id. at ch. 3, para. 16 ("[S] ich men are not under the
ties of the common law of reason, have no other rule, but that of force and violence.").
In this view Locke was not alone. Hobbes took the even more insistent stance that the
offender expressed "contempt" of the legislator and thus breached "all his laws at
once." See HOIBBES, supra note 26, at ch. XXVII, para. I ("A [slin is not only a trans-
gression of a law, but also any contempt of the legislator. For such contempt is a
breach of all his laws at once."); see aLho id. at ch. 27, para. 33 (arguing that the pre-
meditated offender "cast[s] his eye upon the law" and therefore reveals, in his intent,
"contempt" for the law).
181 LOCKE, supra note 56, at ch. 2, para. 7.
Id. at ch. 3, para. 13. This objection is put in the mouth of another, but Locke
readily accedes to an imagined objector's proposition that civil government is neces-
sar' "to restrain the partiality and violence of men." But he adds that it is important
not to repeat the evil in government itself by relying upon an absolute monarch who,
too, will he the Itudge in his own case," doing to his "subjects whatever he pleases," and
"[e] xecut[ing at] his pleasure." Id.
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rests on a principle that Stephen Holmes has called the "strong norm
at the heart of liberal morality: the self-exemption prohibition."' In
civil society, neither state nor man (including the king) "can be ex-
empted from the laws of [civil society]," said Locke, 4 and, in this, his
views were shared by a variety of otherwise differently-positioned lib-
eral thinkers, including Blackstone and Montesquieu, Beccaria and
Smith. 5 What makes a monarch into a tyrant but his imposition of
the law on others while exempting himself, making himself "better"
than those whom he rules? What makes an individual offender into
one who subordinates another but his exemption of himself from the
rules of nonviolent interactions by the use of force, making himself
dominant over those he harms?
The risk of self-exemption poses an extraordinarily serious prob-
lem for any liberal theory of the state. If there are no restraints on the
individual use of violence, then liberalism is impossible because the
strong will rule over the weak. But if one institutes government to
control individual violence, one must control not only those being
governed but also those governing from, again, instituting a rule of
the strong. Without controlling the latter, one has replaced one form
of aristocracy of the strong with another.
If this is right, then we can return to the basic premise with which
I began this Article and hear the modern vernacular in its more an-
cient context. Listen to the angry debates about some of the most
controversial criminal law cases. Hear critics of Bernhard Goetz cry
that he "took the law into his own hands." 1'8 Or listen to the critic of
183 HOLMES, supra note 25, at 238.
1841 LOCKE, supfra note 56, at ch. 7, para. 94, quoted in HOLMES, suln'a note 25, at
238.
", "[l]n republics private crimes ... [run counter to] the constitution [of the
state] more than [against] individuals; and, in monarchies, public crimes are more
private, that is, they" run counter to individual fortunes more than against the consti-
tution of the state. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 27, at bk. Ill, ch. 5. One cannot inflict
great punishments, and consequently, make great changes, without putting a great
power into the hands of a tew citizens. On the pretext of avenging the republic, one
could establish the tyranny of the avengers. Id. at bk. XII, ch. 18; see a1o HOLMES, su-
pra note 25, at 238-39 (discussing Beccaria, Montesquieu, Blackstone, Smith, and the
anti-self-exemption principle).
186Jay Mader, Quality of Life: The Subway Vigilante, N.Y. DAIlY NEWS, Nov. 8, 2001,
at 79; see also A Goetz Trial Again, WASLI. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1996, at A16 ("When Bernie
Goetz ... took the law into his hands on Dec. 22, 1984, a lot of law-abiding citizens...
were absolutely prepared to believe he'd acted in self-defense when he shot them. And
ajury agreed. Mr. Goetz was acquitted of assault and attempted murder in 1987.").
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Judy Norman who claims she became 'judge and executioner.
' '
11
7
These are not isolated phrases. They punctuate law review articles
and news accounts; they appear on television newscasts and in legal
treatises, asserted by both scholars and pundits alike.18 8  Now look
closer. Goetz is accused not of an individual failing-of lacking self-
control, making bad choices, or having a bad character-but rather,
he is accused of being a "lawmaker." Similarly, Norman is not being
accused of individual failings such as psychological trauma or even
failed virtue but, instead, she is accused of being an "executioner."
These are structural sins, not individual ones. This should be less of a
surprise. For, to see in violence risks to governance and governing
structures is to silently invoke a rather ancient tradition in liberal po-
litical philosophy.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
At this point, having countered the most obvious objections, it is
worthwhile turning to the theory's implications. How does criminal
law and theory change if we accept my premise that it has constructive
and political import-that we cannot simply look at the content of the
prohibition alone, but must consider its effects on majorities and gov-
ernance as well? In this concluding section, I present but a sketch of
the possibilities.
A. New Questions for Doctrine and Study
If I am right, then we have a new set of collateral effects questions
to ask about the standard doctrines of the substantive criminal law.
We may put to the side, at least for the purposes of inquiry, the ques-
tions typically asked about whether a particular criminal rule or doc-
trine serves the "purposes" of retribution or deterrence. Such ques-
tions, after all, assume that we can corral these concepts within
manageable terms and, perhaps more importantly, that they are the
only possible "purposes" one might posit for a criminal law. "'8 If the
187 See Fletcher, supra note 67, at 556 ("[H]owever tragically Judy Norman's ap-
peals to the authorities went unheeded, she cannot put herself in the position ofjudge
and executioner.").
188 Scholars definitely are not immune from this tendency. 1d. at 553; see aLw
Sanford H. Kadish, Fifty Years of Criminal Law: An Opinionated Review, 87 CAL. L. REV.
943, 967 (1999) (noting that there was a reluctance to embrace a necessity defense lest
it "encourage people to take the law into their own hands").
1s! Nietzsche exploded this idea by outlining an exceedingly long list of the possi-
ble "purposes" of punishment. FRIEDRICti NIETZSCIHE, THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS:
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criminal law serves to create public order-if it governs-then pre-
sumably there are other "public law" questions to be asked. And, as I
have argued above, those questions may well provide us with new per-
spective. For, as we have seen, in such a world, questions of insanity
may become ones of citizenship and questions of necessity may be-
come ones of legislative tyranny.
We need not exclude the old questions, of course, but in asking
these new ones, we may gain perspective on some rather persistent
problems. The great irony here is that, although these questions have
a "public" and institutional aspect, this kind of inquiry may actually
help to depoliticize various debates (where "politicize" is used in its
more colloquial sense of being unprincipled or ad hoc). Today, pub-
lic and even scholarly debates about the criminal law tend to be ar-
rayed on a spectrum of how one feels about defendants-whether one
believes defendants are likely to be oppressed (a liberal pro-defendant
position) or whether one believes that they are likely to be oppressors
(a conservative pro-victim posture). The truth, of course, is that this is
far too crude a calculus; indeed, it is nothing more than a set of
prejudices. Any realistic approach toward the criminal law must con-
sider not only the demands of those likely to be victimized, but also
accused victimizers and their relation to each other. We cannot
achieve such perspective, however, if we imagine thatjustice depends
upon maintaining these questions in isolation.
Finally, and it is important to emphasize this, recognizing the pub-
lic law aspects of the criminal law does not mean capitulating to what
lawyers somewhat derisively call "politics." Indeed, it requires us to
imagine not only public permissions, but also public limits. To take a
simple example, debates about criminalization have often centered
around the question of whether the law should preferentially protect
individuals or society."' But note what these conventional positions
share: the idea that one must choose between two discrete and discon-
nected alternatives-the individual on the one side and society on the
other. A collateral effects theory of the criminal law makes no such
assumption but considers the possibility that there is a false dichotomy
PEOPLES AND COUNTRIES 92-95 (Horace B. Samuel trans., Oscar Levy ed., 1964)
(1887).
190 Consider, for example, the Hart-Devlin debate concerning whether individual
or social harm should be the measure of a crime. For a recent account of the debate,
see Bernard E. Harcourt, Criminal Law: The Collapse of/the Harm Principle, 90J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOI.OGY 109 (1999).
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in play. 1' To take a contemporary example, a perspective that focuses
on political effect does not ask whether sodomy laws would harm indi-
viduals or violate social norms. l'2 Instead, it asks what kind of public
order such laws help to construct. Such an approach considers not
only whether sodomy laws express contempt for particular persons'
sexual orientation, but also whether they contribute to a political or-
der of heterosexual supremacy-by enlisting government violence in
the enforcement of sexual inequality.
B. Explaining Confounding Theoretical Developments
If this analysis raises new questions for doctrinal practice, it also
raises new questions for substantive criminal law theory. In particular,
it helps to make sense of three recent theoretical developments that,
from the hyperindividualist perspective, appear to be rather disturb-
ing, or at least anomalous: the rise of feminism, the decline of the
harm principle, and the emergence of social norms in the literature of
the substantive criminal law.
It has come as something of a surprise to traditionally-educated
academics that, of all the developments in legal scholarship in the past
twenty years, feminism has had such an impact on the substantive
criminal law. " Indeed, some have suggested, somewhat derisively,
that the impact of feminism has been "political," where "political" is
meant to operate as a synonym for "partial" or "unprincipled." If I am
right, however, there is a theoretical framework which predicts this
development: feminists take the view that the criminal law has, em-
bedded within it, rules that help to constitute a gendered political or-
der. Hostility to feminism's challenges to the criminal law, in this
sense, reflects no hostility to women, but a resistance to the public
dimensions of feminism. It is only if one assumes that the political
191 In this sense, this project takes its inspiration (albeit not its doctrinal subject
matter) from the law and society movement which was, originally, clubbed law in soci-
ety to avoid such a dichotomizing move. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., In Memoriam:
Willard Hurst, Master of the LegalProcess, 1997 WISc. L. REV. 1181, 1183 (describing the
earliest class on public lawmaking and noting that the teaching materials were entitled
Law in Society).
92 This example is the problem that inspired the Hart-Devlin debate. See Har-
court, supra note 190, at 118-20 (introducing the origin and historical transformation
of the Hart-Devlin debate).
193 See Fletcher, supra note 28, at 279 ("The only academic movement of the 1980s
that made an impact on criminal law was feminism."); Kadish, supra note 188, at 974
("Feminism ... is the one major movement of the period that has had a significant
impact on the shape of the criminal law.").
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order should have nothing to do with the criminal law that feminism's
claims about a public gendered order may be deemed self-evidently
political where the tern "political" is a synonym for "unprincipled."
A similar analysis helps to explain the fears elicited, under tradi-
tional theory, by the collapse of the "harm" principle. The Hart-
Devlin debate seemed to place "harm to individuals" at the center of
scholarship about liberalism and the criminal law. As Bernard Har-
court rightly insisted, however, the "harm" principle has appeared to
unravel in the latter half of the twentieth century.'' From a tradi-
tional, individualist view, of course, this should seem very troubling
indeed; the harm principle has been considered one of the most basic
limits on the exercise of criminal law jurisdiction. '15 But if political
norms play a decided role in creating the criminal law, one should
hardly find their role in determining "harms" unusual; indeed, one
would expect that majoritarian norms would seek to define and rede-
fine "harm" in their own image. What Harcourt, along with many tra-
ditional scholars, is worried about is the risk that majoritarian norms
may be biased and thus may covertly punish based on status or race or
some other prejudicial reason. Return, for example, to the criminal
law's treatment of sodomy. The real problem with sodomy statutes is
not that they cannot be found to address someone's odd sense of
harm, but, rather, that they are "code" for the oppression of persons
based on sexual orientation. That, in turn, is not only a problem for
individuals but for the notion of a liberal order as well. By using vio-
lence to enforce sexual inequality and heterosexist superiority, the
state taints its own claims to democratic legitimacy.'
I See Harcourt, supa note 190, at 113 ("[T]he harm principle is effectively col-
lapsing tnder the weight of its own success. Claims of harm have become so pervasive
that the harm principle has become meaningless ....").
195 See id. (suggesting that the collapse of the harm principle means the loss of a
"critical principle" limiting the scope of the criminal law, and marking a "radical de-
parture firom the liberal theoretic, progressive discourse of the 1960s"); id. at 115-16
(contending that the liberal philosophical consensus is that harm is required to pun-
ish, but that this "liberal" position, taken by H.L.A. Hart, Joel Feinberg, and Ronald
Dworkin, has been "colonized by conservatives").
9 As one may glean from this discttssion, I am sympathetic to the recent call by
Bill Stuntz for greater consideration of the ways in which governmental structure has
an intlUence on the criminal law. See William 1. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Crimi-
nal Law, 100 Mict. L. REV. 50,5, 587-600 (2001) (suggesting that courts should have
more power to craft criminal law because they will balance out the power of legisla-
tures and prosecutors to "define crimes as they wish"). Indeed, I believe that this "pUb-
lic law" approach may help to provide the background theory for those interested in
the quest, at the doctrinal level, to constitutionalize basic rIles of substantive criminal
law. Traditionally, the arguments that couIrts and commentators have Used to constitu-
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Finally, "public law" questions help to secure a strong place in the
criminal law for social norms. In the past ten years or so, criminal law
scholarship has moved rapidly toward a growing consensus that social
norms are strong influences on the enforcement and the meaning of
the criminal law. This, of course, has come as something of a shock
to the hyperindividualist, resistant as she is to any shift in focus toward
society. And yet, from a "public law" perspective, this move toward
norms seems not only advisable but essential-even if it remains in-
complete. As even its strongest adherents suggest, once one comes to
view social norms as upwardly mobile within the criminal law, one
must confront the fact that sometimes these norms reflect disdain,
cultural prejudice, or general ugliness. There is no question, of
course, that throughout our history the criminal law has been used as
a means to express contempt for others. That this is an inevitable and
nasty part of democratic politics is to be bemoaned. But it seems eas-
ier, to me, to try to counter such hubris if one recognizes that it is a
political order that is at stake. That social norms play a role in the
criminal law does not mean that they must always and in every form be
allowed to control the criminal law.
C. The Relation Between Substance and Procedure
If the substantive criminal law is to come out of the shadow of its
bell-bottom years, if it is to move beyond the twentieth century's ob-
session with defendants' psyches and personality characteristics, then
we must be wise enough to begin to challenge the "givens" of the con-
struction of the very subject matter of the criminal law. First, we must
consider two important aspects of the traditional canon: the conven-
tional split between the substance of criminal law and the procedure
of criminal cases, and the deliberate isolation from public law that has
characterized criminal law scholarship.
It is not only at the doctrinal level that we have seen the criminal
law imagine individuals isolated from the state; the public/private
split can be seen as well in the very construction of the "subject mat-
ter" of the criminal law. It is conventional, for example, to teach a
certain set of doctrines in the substantive criminal law, leaving all mat-
tionalize certain practices or niles in the criminal law have invariably focused on indi-
viduals or on procedures. A collateral effects approach suggests that the proper form
of the argument may be structural.
197 See Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U..CHii. L. REv. 591,
592-94 (1996) (suggesting that by examining social norms society might be able to
identify meaningful alternative forms of punishment).
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ters having to do with the "state" to criminal, procedure. Substantive
criminal law teachers thus prefer to teach about Martin 8 as a case
about willed bodily movements or about Norman"' as one of syn-
dromes or about Hinkley 200 as about mental illness. But, relegating
the state to the "procedural realm" at the outset may well blind us to
important questions about the relation of the state to individuals-
about who took Martin out of the house (the police) or why Norman
did not seek help (state refusal to assist). Indeed, by severing criminal
procedure from the substantive criminal law, we have severed the
criminal law from its rather obvious connections to the creation of a
liberal polity, only reinforcing the assumptions with which we began
(the disconnect between individual and society).
This realization may be particularly important in an era where
there are many reasons to believe that courts are unlikely to grant new
procedural rights. As courts-particularly federal courts-become in-
stitutions with shrinking capacity, a public law approach suggests
that we will be faced with increasing risks to governmental structure
(effected by means of the criminal law). What I mean by this is that if
rights have institutional implications, implications for the protection
of us all, then as rights decline in power and scope we can expect to
see larger and larger pockets of "inadvertent aristocracy" in this coun-
try. For example, consider that there are currently places in America
where minorities remain unrepresented precisely because of the
criminal law. Go into the poor, urban, minority neighborhoods of
this nation and try to round tIp voters and you will find vast numbers
of people disenfranchised by the rule that felons cannot vote. In a
world where rights and structure are imagined and maintained as
separate intellectual projects, such conditions may well be rendered
invisible or disregarded.
Criminal law teachers have not always been loathe to talk about
the criminal law and the demands of a liberal polity. Once upon a
time, it was perfectly appropriate for a scholar to talk of the criminal
law as "an instrument of the state."2"' In 1933, Jerome Michael and
t98 Martin v. State, 17 So. 2d 427 (Ala. Ct. App. 1944).
19 State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1989).
See supra notes 120-24 and accompanying text (discussing the Hinckley case).
2S1 ee NELl. K. KOMESAR, LAw'S LIMITS: THE ROLE OF LAW AND THE SUPPLY AND
DEMAND OF RIGHTS 185 (2001) (arguing that in an increasingly complex and global-
ized world the "tiny adjudicative process" will be in increasing demand and will not be
able to grow as fast as alternative institutions like the political process and the market).
202 MICHAEL & ADLER, su/ra note 1, at 342-43.
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Mortimer Adler could write openly about how the criminal law served
the modern liberal state,20 but this kind of intellectual focus has long
since been omitted from the pages of the law reviews. In part, this re-
sult was motivated by historical events, most notably totalitarian abuses
of the criminal law both before and after World War II. The lesson
taken from this historical experience was that the criminal law must
protect individuality at all costs. But, as I have tried to show here
(with the "paradox of individuality"), focusing our efforts on individu-
alization may be necessary but is not sufficient to ensure the justice of
the criminal law.
In the end, a public law perspective beckons to those scholars who
have an interest or a background in disciplines that may help to put
the criminal law's commitments in public perspective. It is the study
of history and political structure that brought me, for example, to
some of the insights gained here. It is from that study, along with the
study of comparative criminal law, that we may gain greater insight
into how criminal law governs. One might profitably, it seems to me,
engage in comparative, empirical studies of how changes in criminal
law affect or reflect changes in political structure. Similarly, one
might achieve a similar sort of perspective from a study of the histori-
cal development of various doctrines or theories, to illuminate how
the law came to evolve in directions that reflected changing concep-
tions of political or cultural order. History, political theory, and com-
parative law are all likely to be essential in this ongoing project. But
such an account is not even possible in a world where criminal law is
public law in name only.
CONCLUSION
The criminal law not only punishes individuals but governs us all.
If this is right, then it should seem odder that criminal law scholarship
has generally sought to avoid "the political." If, indeed, the criminal
law is viewed as a means of governance, then it is both more important
than it is generally believed to be and less arcane than we might have
203 See, e.g., id. at 342 ("[T]he criminal law like any other body of law having a po-
litical sanction, is an instrument of the state. It is designed and administered for the
sake of the welfare of a political society, however much in fact it may serve contrary
purposes."). The authors continue: "[B]ehavior... is determined to be undesirable
by reference to the constitution of a particular political society. Since states differ in their
constitutions and since their constitutions determine their welfare differently, behavior
which is contrary to the welfare of one state may not be so considered in another." Id.
at 354.
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otherwise thought. It is more important because it serves as the very
foundation for any constitutional order. It is less arcane and special-
ized because it becomes a fundamental branch of a more generalized
vision of public law.
I recognize that this is not at all how the criminal law is taught or
understood today. The traditional view tries to keep ideas of political
theory at bay, either going above the state (to morality) or below it (to
individuals). I have struggled with this Article in large part as an at-
tempt to bring the criminal law back within the public law academy to
show how debates about representation, citizenship, and majoritarian-
ism might have something to do with the criminal law even in the last
place that one might look-in the criminal law's most particular and
defensive doctrines.
